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The Price Is (Not) Right: Mandatory
Arbitration of Claims Arising Out of
Sexual Violence Should Not Be the
Price of Earning a Living
ABSTRACT

As demonstrated by the #MeToo movement, current attempts to
curtail systemic sexual violence in the workplace have fallen flat:
approximately sixty million US workers are subject to mandatory
arbitrationclauses, which employers tend to bury deep within the fine
print of employment contracts. These clauses, often coupled with
confidentiality agreements, have provided offenders-and their
employers-with a mechanism to escape liability and public scrutiny.
Under the existing judicial framework, whether a court will allow
victims of workplace sexual violence to escape binding arbitration
remains unclear. Congress attempted to address this uncertainty by
proposing the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual HarassmentAct of
2017. Though well intentioned, Congress failed to properly tailor the
bill to all forms of sexual violence in the workplace. This Note argues
that employees should never be compelled to arbitrateclaims of sexual
violence, but rather should be afforded the choice to either arbitrateor
instead resolve the matter in court. Moreover, this Note advocates for an
amendment to the proposed bill-replacingthe term "sex discrimination
dispute" with "sexual violence dispute"-to explicitly prohibitemployers
from mandating binding arbitrationof any claims of sexual assault,
misconduct, or harassment. Through this modification, Congress can
empower victims to share their stories if, when, and where they so choose.
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"Silence is the most powerful weapon of the harasser."' As the
#MeToo movement demonstrates, Hollywood refuses to stay silent any
longer. 2 The #MeToo movement captured national attention when
actress Alyssa Milano posted on social media about her personal
experiences being harassed, further asking women who had been
sexually harassed or assaulted to respond to her post with "Me too." 3
By the next day, Twitter users had tweeted "#MeToo" more than half a
million times.4
As evidenced by the overwhelming flood of social media
responses, sexual harassment and sexual assault reach far beyond the
Hollywood Hills. At least one in four US women say they have
experienced sexual harassment in the workplace,' and it is estimated
that there are more than forty-three thousand workplace rapes and
sexual assaults per year.6 Studies suggest that these numbers vastly
underestimate the actual figures because many victims are afraid to
come forward due to retaliation concerns. 7
Roughly 50 percent of women will experience sexual harassment
during their careers.8 Unlike victims of other crimes, such as robbery
1.
(2017).
2.

GRETCHEN CARLSON, BE FIERCE: STOP HARASSMENT AND TAKE YOUR POWER BACK 7
For

a

more

detailed

account

of

the

#MeToo

movement,

visit

ME

TOO.,

https://metoomvmt.org/ [https://perma.cclVVM9-NVCZ]; see also Chris Snyder & Linette Lopez,
Tarana Burke on Why She Created the #MeToo Movement-and Where It's Headed, BUS. INSIDER

(Dec. 13, 2017, 10:16 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-the-metoo-movement-started[https://perma.cclME8Awhere-its-headed-tarana-burke-time-person-of-year-women-20 17-12
WXM3].
Lisa Respers France, #MeToo: Social Media Flooded with Personal Stories of Assault,
3.
CNN (Oct. 16, 2017, 7:12 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/15/entertainment/me-too-twitteralyssa-milano/index.html [https://perma.cc/TUD5-42B8].
4.
Id.
CHAi. R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
5.
REPORT OF THE CO-CHAIRS OF THE EEOC SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN

THE WORKPLACE 8 (2016). The US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) provided
the first legal definition of sexual harassment in 1980 when it issued guidelines regarding two
broad classes of prohibited behavior: (1) quid pro quo harassment, which is defined as "attempts
to extort sexual cooperation by means of subtle or explicit threats of job-related consequences,"

and (2) hostile work environment, which is defined as "pervasive sex-related verbal or physical
conduct that is unwelcome or offensive," regardless of a tangible employment-related consequence.
Louise F. Fitzgerald, Sexual Harassment: Violence Against Women in the Workplace, 48 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1070, 1070 (1993). Although individuals may perceive sexual harassment
differently, it "has become increasingly understood as any deliberate or repeated sexual behavior
that is unwelcome to its recipient, as well as other sex-related behaviors that are hostile, offensive,
or degrading." Id.
Yuki Noguchi, UnderreportingMakes Sexual Violence at Work Difficult to Address,
6.
NPR (Feb. 23, 2016, 6:04 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/02/23/467826376/underreporting-makessexual-violence-at-work-difficult-to-address [https://perma.cc/F6B6-CR28].
FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 5, at 5, 16-17.
7.
Melanie S. Harned et al., Sexual Assault and Other Types of Sexual Harassment by
8.
Workplace Personnel:A ComparisonofAntecedents and Consequences, 7 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH

PSYCHOL. 174, 174 (2002). While the majority of the research and public discussion about sexual
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or nonsexual physical assault, sexual assault and sexual harassment
victims often must show subsequent emotional damage to be considered
credible in either a court of law or the court of public opinion. 9 Further,
victims of sexual crimes or misconduct can expect negatively toned
questioning, which attacks their credibility and calls their character
into question. 10
Many employees are subject to mandatory arbitration clauses
within their employment contracts-a practice that critics describe as
a "whole-scale privatization of the justice system."" Approximately
sixty million US workers are subject to such provisions, which are often
buried deep within the fine print of a contract. 12 Generally speaking, a
mandatory arbitration clause in an employment contract is an
agreement not to pursue any legal action against one's employer in
court. 1 3

Instead,

the

clause

mandates

adjudication

in

private

arbitration, where a binding decision is made by a "neutral" third-party
arbitrator. 14 Arbitration clauses within employment contracts provide
harassment and assault focuses on the female victim, it is important not to overlook male victims.
In studies from victims presenting to a sexual assault referral center or emergency department,

&

males accounted for around 3 to 5 percent of victims. Clayton M. Bullock & Mace Beckson, Male
Victims of Sexual Assault: Phenomenology, Psychology, Physiology, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
L. 197, 199 (2011). However, other studies suggest that male victims severely underreport sexual
assaults due to a variety of erroneous societal misconceptions, including: (1) that men in
noninstitutionalized settings are rarely sexually assaulted; (2) that male victims are somehow
responsible for their assaults; (3) that male victims are less traumatized by the experience; and (4)
that the incidence of sexual assault of men is so rare as to not merit attention. Id. at 197, 200-01.
These unfounded beliefs lead to greater social stigmas for male victims, which may ultimately
preclude them from obtaining effective legal redress. Id. at 197-98.
9.
Suresh Sahjpaul & K. Edward Renner, The New Sexual Assault Law: The Victim's
Experience in Court, 16 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 503, 511-12 (1988). The requirement placed
upon victims to demonstrate emotional damage resulting from the sexual encounter is known as
"rape trauma syndrome." Id. at 511. In their capacity as expert witnesses, psychologists may
actually be "contributing to a further victimization by implicitly requiring a victim of sexual
assault to also become a mental health case in order to have others accept the first victimization
as valid." Id. Rape trauma syndrome as a prosecutorial strategy has been criticized as reinforcing
stereotypes and counterproductive to true legal reform. Id.
10.
Id. at 511.
11.
Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, A 'Privatizationof the
Justice
System',
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
1,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/201 5/11/02/business/dealbooklin-arbitration-a-privatization-of-thejustice-system.html [https://perma.cc/57BJ-5ZDV]; see also KATHERINE V.W. STONE & ALEXANDER
J.S. COLVIN, ECON POLICY INST., THE ARBITRATION EPIDEMIc: MANDATORY ARBITRATION DEPRIVES
WORKERS AND CONSUMERS OF THEIR RIGHTS 3 (2015), https://www.epi.org/files/2015/arbitration-

epidemic.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4RQ-ZWR6].
12.
Rachel Gillett, More Than Half of American Workers Wouldn't Be Able to Take Their
Sexual Harassment Claims to Court, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 30, 2017, 4:27 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/mandatory-arbitration-clause-sexual-harassment-claims-201711 [https://perma.cc/2UHB-AV3W].
13.
Robin Perkins, Could an Arbitration Clause Block Your Sexual Harassment Claim?,
PERKINS & ASSOCS. (Mar. 15, 2017), http://www.perkins-lawoffice.com/blog/2017/03/could-anarbitration-clause-block-your-sexual-harassment-claim.shtml [https://perma.ce/Q4BX-HCV2].
14.
See id. For a further discussion of arbitrators' potential biases, see infra Section II.A.2.
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a cheaper and less formal method of resolution for disputes arising out
of the employer-employee relationship.15 This Note argues that while
efficient, arbitration is an inappropriate forum for resolving claims of
sexual harassment or sexual assault because arbitration proceedings
are often secret and do not create precedent to help resolve further
disputes. 16 Further, when combined with confidentiality agreements,
mandatory arbitration clauses provide a shield for harassers and
offenders to escape liability.17 This shield particularly damages efforts
to address sexual harassment in the public sphere, because the
secretive nature of mandatory arbitration safeguards harassers from
accountability, perpetuates predatory behavior, and silences victims.1 8
This Note argues that the appropriate solution to the
aforementioned issues is to amend the Ending Forced Arbitration of
Sexual Harassment Act of 2017, which has been introduced in both the
House and Senate. As currently drafted, the bill would prohibit
employers from enforcing arbitration agreements with respect to
employee allegations of workplace sexual harassment or any claim of
gender discrimination that could be raised under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act1 9 (Title VII). This Note's proposed amendment would bar all
private and public employers from entering into or enforcing mandatory
arbitration provisions for any claims relating to or arising out of any
forms of sexual violence, including sexual harassment, sexual assault,
or sexual misconduct. This amendment would ensure that both sexual
assault and sexual harassment victims get their day in court, if they so
choose. Moreover, it would leave the door open for the use of valid
binding arbitration agreements for nonsexual, workplace-related
Part I introduces the Federal Arbitration Act 2 0 (FAA),
claims.
Elizabeth A. Roma, Note, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Employment Contracts
15.
and the Need for Meaningful JudicialReview, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 519, 520 (2004).
For a similar suggestion highlighting the weaknesses of arbitration over litigation, see
16.
generally 155 Cong. Rec. S 10,028 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 2009) (statement of Sen. Franken) ("Arbitration
has its place in our justice system. . .. But arbitration has its limits. Arbitration is conducted
behind closed doors and doesn't bring persistent, recurring, and egregious problems to the
attention of the public. Arbitration doesn't ever allow a jury of your peers. Arbitration doesn't
establish important precedent that can be used in later cases.").
See Emily Martin, Keeping Sexual Assault Under Wraps, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
17.
(Sept. 28, 2016, 2:10 PM), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-09-28/fox-news-forcedPerkins,
[https://perma.cc/8AXT-HVNR];
arbitration-keeps-sexual-harassment-under-wraps/
supra note 13.

Id.
18.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1964)
19.
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (2012)); Benjamin Dudek, Could Congress
Ban Arbitration of Sex Discriminationand Harassment Claims?, FISHER PHILLIPS (Dec. 8, 2017),
https://www.fisherphillips.com/resources-alerts-could-congress-ban-arbitration-of-sex-

discrimination [https://perma.cclW3QY-JXQJ].
United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as
20.
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012)).
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subsequent Supreme Court opinions interpreting its application, and
legislative attempts to limit its scope. Part I also examines recent
Hollywood scandals regarding sexual violence and describes public
responses to these scandals. Part II analyzes the dangers of subjecting
sex-based claims to binding arbitration and details the current judicial
framework for determining whether a sex-based claim is arbitrable
under a binding arbitration clause within an employment contract.
Part III proposes amending the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual
Harassment Act by replacing the term "sex discrimination dispute"
with "sexual violence dispute" to unambiguously prohibit employers
from enforcing binding arbitration clauses in employment contracts for
claims of all sexual assault, sexual misconduct, and sexual harassment.
Part IV emphasizes the need for immediate legislative action to ensure
that victims of sexual violence in the workplace are empowered to share
their stories when and where they so choose.

I. BACKGROUND
Arbitration clauses within employment contracts are governed
by the FAA. 2 1 The Supreme Court liberally construes and generally
upholds these provisions, 22 which, in turn, has prompted numerous
legislative attempts to limit the scope of the FAA.
A. The FederalArbitrationAct
The FAA governs all binding arbitration agreements between
employers and employees. 23 Enacted in 1925, the FAA provides for
contractually based, judicial facilitation of private dispute resolution. 24
The FAA describes arbitration agreements as follows:
[A] written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce
to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter . . . arising out of such a contract,
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 25

Under such an arbitration provision, a dispute is submitted to
one or more arbitrators, who enter a binding judgment that may include

21.
Id.
22.
For further discussion of the Supreme Court's interpretations of the FAA, see infra
Section I.B.
23.
See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 105 (2001).
24.
Id. at 111; Supreme Court Action: The FederalArbitrationAct Applies to the States,
DANIEL
KRON,
ESQ.,
https://www.nylitigationfirm.com/supreme-court-action-the-federalarbitration-act-applies-to-the-states/# [https://perma.cc/JQU9-C5YW] (last visited Sept. 30, 2017).
25.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
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an award. 26 Should any issues arise in enforcing the judgment, a court
of law must confirm the award within one year, 27 and any objection by
a challenging party must be brought within three months after the
award is filed or delivered. 28 An arbitration ruling carries the same
force and effect as a judgment rendered in a court of law. 29 By agreeing
to arbitrate, both parties waive the right to appeal to a court on
substantive grounds. 30
B. The Supreme Court's Interpretationof the FAA
Since the inception of the FAA, the Supreme Court has liberally
construed and generally upheld mandatory arbitration provisions. 31 In
1984, the Court held the FAA's application to state and federal courts
is constitutional, which further expanded the reach of arbitration
agreements into virtually every walk of life. 32 According to the Court,
the FAA represents a congressional declaration of a national policy
favoring arbitration, and thus generally mandates state enforcement of
arbitration agreements. 33
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., the Supreme Court
addressed binding arbitration clauses within employment contracts. 34
In accordance with the terms of his collective bargaining agreement 35
(CBA), Alexander-a discharged employee-filed a grievance with his
union, which went to binding arbitration per the terms of his
employment contract. 36 Immediately prior to the arbitration hearing,
26.
See § 5 (providing more details about the appointment of arbitrators under the FAA).
27.
§ 9. According to the FAA, "at any time within one year after the award is made any
party to the arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order confirming the award, and
thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected
as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title." Id.
§ 12.
28.
29.
§ 13.
§ 10 (limiting the grounds for appeal of a final arbitration award).
30.
See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)
31.
("The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope
of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability.").
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17 (1984) (holding that the FAA was binding
32.
on the states, and that a conflicting California law was preempted by federal law and thus invalid).
Id. at 10.
33.
See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
34.
A collective bargaining agreement is a binding, written legal contract between an
35.
employer and an organized labor parties that governs wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment. Collective Bargaining Agreement: What Is a Collective Bargaining
2012),
1,
(June
MGMT.
RESOURCE
HUM.
FOR
Soc'y
Agreement?,
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools- and- samples/hrqalpages/collectivebargainingagreement.aspx Chttps://perma.cc/6YEH-XPLG].
Alexander, 415 U.S. at 38-42.
36.
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Alexander alleged that he was fired due to racial discrimination.3 7 The
arbitration clause of the CBA limited the arbitrator's decision to solely
an interpretation of the CBA itself, and the arbitrator ultimately ruled
Alexander
that Alexander was "discharged for just cause." 3 8
subsequently filed a claim in federal court under Title VII, 3 9 but the
court held that he was precluded from litigating the Title VII claim
based upon the arbitrator's adverse ruling. 40 The Supreme Court,
however, held that an individual can sue under Title VII in court,
despite his submission to arbitration under a CBA.4 1 The Court stated
that "there can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights under
Title VII.

. .

. [T]he rights conferred can form no part of the collective

bargaining process since waiver of these rights would defeat the
paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII." 42 The Court
clarified that an employee who institutes an action under Title VII is
not seeking review of the arbitrator's decision, but rather is "asserting
a statutory right independent of the arbitration process." 43 Thus,
allowing suit does not undermine the finality of the arbitral decision.44
Further, the Court held that the federal courts must hear such Title VII
claims de novo, without formal deference to the arbitrator, but may
admit the arbitrator's decision as evidence. 45
Although the Gardner-Denveropinion suggested that employers
were prohibited from using mandatory arbitration clauses in CBAs to
prevent employees from filing statutory claims, the Supreme Court
limited that seemingly broad protection in later decisions. 4 6 In Gilmer
v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., the Court held that an employee's
claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 196747
(ADEA) was subject to mandatory arbitration pursuant to an

37.
Id. at 42.
38.
Id.
39.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (2012).
40.
Alexander, 415 U.S. at 43.
41.
Id. at 47-49 ("The clear inference is that Title VII was designed to supplement, rather
than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment discrimination.").
42.
Id. at 51.
43.
Id. at 54.
44.
Id.
45.
Id. at 59-60.
46.
See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33-35 (1991). See generally
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985) ("[Bly agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive
rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum.").
47.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, §§ 1-16, 81 Stat.
602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2012)).
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After
arbitration clause in a securities registration application.48
rejecting multiple generalized attacks on the adequacy of arbitration
proceedings, 49 the Court held that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden
of showing that Congress had intended to preclude arbitration of claims
under the ADEA.5 0 In reaching this decision, the Court relied upon (1)
the absence of an explicit prohibition of arbitration of specific claims
within the FAA and its subsequent amendments; 1 (2) a lack of
legislative history evidencing an intent to preclude a waiver of judicial
remedies; 52 and (3) the absence of an "inherent conflict" between
arbitration and the ADEA's underlying purpose of reducing age
discrimination. 53 Although section 1 of the FAA explicitly exempts
contracts entered into by employees engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce, 54 this exception did not apply to a securities registration
application.5 5 Thus, the Court did not clarify whether employment
contracts are within the scope of the exemption within section 1 of the
FAA.56
48.
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
49.
Id. at 30-31, 33. The Court was unpersuaded by Gilmer's argument that arbitration
panels will be biased, citing protections in the NYSE's rules against biased panels, including
unlimited arbitrator selection challenges for cause and arbitrator conflict-of-interest disclosure
requirements. Id. at 30-31. The Court also rejected Gilmer's complaint that the limited nature of

discovery within an arbitration proceeding "will prove insufficient to allow ADEA claimants such
as Gilmer a fair opportunity to present their claims." Id. at 31. The Court pointed to the implicit
bargain inherent in an agreement to arbitrate, in which "a party 'trades the procedures and

opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of
arbitration."' Id. at 31 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628). The Court further opined that "[m]ere
inequality in bargaining power, however, is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration
agreements are never enforceable in the employment context." Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.

50.
Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 20-21.
51.
Id. at 26-27.
52.
53.
Id. at 26-27. The Court also stated that "judicial decisions addressing ADEA claims
will continue to be issued because it is unlikely that all or even most ADEA claimants will be
subject to arbitration agreements." Id. at 31.

9 U.S.C. § 1(2012) ("[Nlothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment
54.
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.").

Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
55.
It is interesting to note, however, that two Justices thought differently. In a dissent
56.
joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Stevens wrote that he believed that arbitration clauses
contained in employment contracts are specifically exempt from coverage of the FAA. Id. at 36
(Stevens, J., dissenting). He cited the legislative history of the FAA in support of this belief:
At the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee hearings on the proposed bill, the chairman of
the ABA committee responsible for drafting the bill assured the Senators that the bill
"is not intended [to] be an act referring to labor disputes, at all. It is purely an act to
give the merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each
other as to what their damages are, if they want to do it."
Id. at 39 (alteration in original). Justice Stevens found that the exclusion in § 1 of the FAA "should
be interpreted to cover any agreements by the employee to arbitrate disputes with the employer
arising out of the employment relationship, particularly where such agreements to arbitrate are
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Although the Court purported to have distinguished its holding
5 7 it again attempted
in Gilmer from its holding in Gardner-Denver,
to
resolve the tension between the two cases in Wright v. Universal
Maritime Service Corp.5 8 In Wright, the Court acknowledged that by
entering into a mandatory arbitration agreement, an employee could
waive a statutory claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990.59 Although Gilmer compelled this result, the Court held that a
union-negotiated waiver of a statutory right to a judicial forum must be
clear and unmistakable.6 0 The Court held that because no such waiver
existed,. the employee could file a lawsuit in lieu of taking his claim to
arbitration.6 1
A sharply divided Court clarified the ambiguities surrounding
section 1 of the FAA in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.62 The Court
further limited employee protections by interpreting "contracts of
employment" very narrowly, clarifying that only transportation
workers' employment contracts are exempted under the FAA. 6 3 Thus,
nearly all mandatory arbitration clauses within employment contracts
are generally upheld and construed liberally in favor of arbitration. 64
On May 21, 2018, the Supreme Court issued a highly anticipated
decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis. Epic Systems, which involved
binding arbitration clauses and class action waivers within employment
contracts. 65 The Court ruled on three consolidated appeals,6 6 each
brought by employees who sought to litigate class actions in federal
court after signing employment contracts that contained both a
mandatory arbitration provision and a class action waiver. 67 These
conditions of employment," and that the majority's additional extension of the FAA was erroneous.
Id. at 40, 43.
57.
Id. at 35 (majority opinion). In Gilmer, the Court distinguished these holdings based
upon the following: (1) the difference between contractual rights under a collective bargaining
agreement and individual statutory rights; (2) the potential disparity in interests between a union
and an employee; and (3) the limited authority and power of labor arbitrators. Id. The Court also
highlighted that Gardener-Denverwas not decided under the FAA. Id. ("Finally, those cases were
not decided under the FAA, which, as discussed above, reflects a 'liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements."') (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 625 (1985)).
58.
Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 70 (1998).
59.
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (2012)).
60.
Wright, 525 U.S. at 80-81.
61.
Id. at 80-82.
62.
See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
63.
Id. at 105.
64.
See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 11, at 4.
65.
See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
66.
Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016); Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp.,
823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015).
67.
Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1616.
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employees alleged that their respective employment agreements
violated the National Labor Relations Act6 8 (NLRA), which protects
workers' rights to bargain collectively.69 The parties further argued
that their arbitration provisions were unenforceable due to a savings
clause within the FAA, which prohibited mandatory arbitration if the
arbitration agreement violates another federal law-in this case, the
NLRA. 70 The Court held 5-4 that the arbitration provision and class
action waiver were enforceable under federal law, reasoning that the
FAA must be enforced as written.7 1 In his majority opinion, Justice
Gorsuch noted that the Court had "never read a right to class actions
into the NLRA" and that nothing within the NLRA suggested that
Congress intended to displace the FAA. 72 He reasoned that by enacting
the FAA, Congress "instructed federal courts to enforce arbitration
agreements according to their terms," including those regarding
individualized proceedings.7 3 He further opined that "it's the job of
Congress by legislation, not this Court by supposition, both to write the
laws and to repeal them." 74
The dissent in Epic Systems, which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor,
75
Kagan, and Ginsburg joined, called the decision "egregiously wrong"
emphasizing that "[e]mployees' rights to band together to meet their
employers' superior strength would be worth precious little if employers
76
could condition employment on workers signing away those rights."
Justice Ginsburg raised concerns that the Court "ignores the reality"
that acting individually, "employees ordinarily are no match for the
enterprise that hires them."7 7 Justice Ginsburg criticized the Court's
apparent willingness to enforce unbargained-for agreements between
Overall, the Court's decision in Epic
employers and employees.7 8
Systems slowed public momentum in favor of providing all workers with
an unassailable right to be heard in court, sparking criticism that

National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449, 449-57 (1935) (codified
68.
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012)).
Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1617.
69.
Id. at 1622.
70.
Id. at 1632.
71.
Id. at 1619.
72.
73.
Id.
Id. at 1624.
74.
Id. at 1633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
75.
Id. at 1641.
76.
Id. at 1640. Further, Justice Ginsburg found that "[t]he FAA's legislative history also
77.
shows that Congress did not intend the statute to apply to arbitration provisions in employment
contracts." Id. at 1643.
Id. at 1648-49.
78.
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companies are now able to completely prohibit employees from banding
together either privately or through the judicial system.7 9
C. Legislative Responses to the FAA
1. The Franken Amendment
Within the defense-contracting sector specifically, Congress has
already acknowledged the impropriety of forcing claims of sexual
violence into binding arbitration proceedings.8 0 In 2010, Congress
passed the Franken Amendment, which limits the ability of certain
Department of Defense contractors and subcontractors to enter into or
enforce certain mandatory arbitration agreements with their
employees.8 1 Namely, the Franken Amendment limits contractors'
ability to enter into or enforce mandatory arbitration provisions
regarding the following:
(1) claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; or (2) tort claims related to
or arising out of sexual assault or harassment including sexual assault and battery;
intentional infliction of emotional distress; false imprisonment; or negligent hiring,
82
supervision or retention (collectively . . . "covered claims").

The Franken Amendment does not address the use of mandatory
arbitration agreements for noncovered claims, such as wage disputes. 83
Jamie Leigh Jones's chilling story of sexual assault was the
impetus behind the Franken Amendment.8 4 Jones alleged that her
colleagues gang-raped her while working in Iraq.8 5 Her complaint
stated that after being subjected to sexual harassment in her
predominantly male, employer-provided housing accommodation, she

79.
See id. at 1646 ("The inevitable result of today's decision will be the underenforcement
of federal and state statutes designed to advance the well-being of vulnerable workers."); Nitasha
Tiku, Supreme Court Rules Against Workers in Arbitration Case, WIRED (May 21, 2018, 6:04 PM),
https://www.wired.com/story/supreme-court-rules-against-workers-in-arbitration-case/
[https://perma.cclY73A-AV8W].
80.
See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, H.R. 3326, 111th Cong. § 8116
(2009) (enacted) ("Franken Amendment").
81.
H.R. 3326 § 8116; Frank Murray, Assessing the Franken Amendment, LAW360 (Feb.
16,
2011),
https://www.foley.comlfiles/Publication/b7719898-dbl4-44bc-bc2db47edeOb7e6c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/fdc6a5db-da4a-4517-bc83b6679194089b/AssessingTheFrankenAmendment.pdf [https://perma.cc/2M2E-G35T].
82.
For a more thorough assessment of the Franken Amendment, including definitions of
"contractor," "covered contracts," and "flow down" requirements, see Murray, supra note 81.
83.
See id.
84.
See Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009).
85.
Id. at 231; see also Jeffrey D. Polsky, Can't You Be for Arbitration and Against Rape?,
Fox
ROTHSCHILD
LLP
(Feb.
17,
2011),
https://californiaemploymentlaw.foxrothschild.com/2011/02/articles/discrimination/cant-you-befor-arbitration-and-against-rape/ [https://perma.cc/GR94-JFGR].
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requested to move to a safer location.8 6 Jones contended that her
employer-a US engineering, construction, and private military
contracting company-took no action and as a result, several of her
coworkers drugged, beat, and gang-raped her in her bedroom the next
evening.8 7 Upon her return to the United States, Jones attempted to
sue her employer for various tort claims-including assault and
battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent
hiring, retention, and supervision of employees-based on the alleged
sexual assault.8 8 Her employer sought to compel arbitration of her
claims based on her employment contract, which mandated arbitration
of any claims "related to her employment" or based on personal injury
"arising in the workplace." 89
After undertaking a fact-specific analysis, the US Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that her claims did not "relate to" her
employment, focusing much of its analysis on the location of the
assault. 90 The court opined that the "provision's scope certainly stops
at the bedroom door." 91 Since she was assaulted after work hours while
off-duty in her bedroom, which was "some distance from where she
worked," the court held that her personal injury claims did not arise in
or about the workplace. 92
Jones's story not only compelled the US Court Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit to rule that her arbitration agreement did not prohibit her
from pursuing her claims for sexual assault in court, but it also caused
lawmakers to take notice.93 Shocked by Jones's experiences, thenSenator Al Franken of Minnesota argued that a statutory amendment
was necessary to protect against further attempts by defense
contractors to force their employees to arbitrate claims arising out of
sexual assault or harassment. 94 In his floor statement, Senator
Franken opined that arbitration is an inappropriate forum to resolve
"claims of sexual assault and egregious violations of civil rights"
because it is "conducted behind closed doors" and thereby shields
violators from public accountability. 95

Jones, 583 F.3d at 231.
86.
Id.; see also Our Company, KBR, https://www.kbr.com/pages/Who-We-Are.aspx
87.
[https://perma.cc/625B-6HNL] (last visited Oct. 6, 2018).
Id. at 230; see also Murray, supra note 81.
88.
Jones, 583 F.3d at 230-31; see also Polsky, supra note 85.
89.
Jones, 583 F.3d at 240-41.
90.
Id. at 239.
91.
Id. at 239-41.
92.
See Murray, supranote 81.
93.
94.
See id.
See 155 Cong. Rec. S10,028 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 2009). Ironically, it was public
95.
accountability of this very nature that led Senator Franken to resign from the Senate amidst a
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2. Unsuccessful Congressional Attempts to Limit the Scope of the FAA
In the past ten years, Congress made numerous unsuccessful
attempts to extend the reach of the Franken Amendment beyond the
defense sector.9 6 One such attempt, the Rape Victims Act of 2009,
endeavored to invalidate any arbitration agreement between an
employer and employee "with respect to any claim related to a tort
arising out of rape." 9 7 This statute would have been simultaneously
narrower and broader than the Franken Amendment. While it would
only prohibit mandatory arbitration of torts arising out of rape claims,
it would have applied to all employees, rather than only those receiving
funds under the 2010 Department of Defense Appropriations Act.9 8 The
bill expired with the close of the 111th Congress. 99 Had the Rape
Victims Act passed, Congress surely would have demonstrated its
intent to "preclude a waiver of judicial remedies" that the Supreme
Court requires under Gilmer.100
Senators and Representatives alike have further attemptedand failed-to broadly amend the FAA by invalidating predispute
arbitration agreements arising out of employment, franchise,
consumer, and civil rights disputes. 101 Two such attempts included the
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 and the Arbitration Fairness Act of
2013.102
However, the subcommittee in charge of considering the
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 was discharged on June 21, 2010, and

series of claims of sexual impropriety, including groping women while posing with them for
photographs. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Yamiche Alcindor & Nicholas Fandos, Al Frankento Resign
from
Senate
Amid
Harassment Allegations,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
7,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/07/us/politics/al-franken-senate-sexual-harassment.html
[https://perma.cc/G6SK-JMLT]. During his resignation speech, Mr. Franken described himself as
a "champion for women," stating that as a nation, "[w]e were finally beginning to listen to women
about the ways in which men's actions affect them." Full Text: Al Franken's Resignation Speech on
the Senate Floor, POLITICO (Dec. 7, 2017, 1:19 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/07/alfranken-resignation-speech-transcript-full-text-285960
[https://perma.cc/NW37-GZLY]. For a
more detailed account of his resignation, see Stolberg, Alcindor & Fandos, supra.
96.
See Rape Victims Act of 2009, S. 2915, 111th Cong. (2009).
97.
Id. § 3(a).
98.
Eric Koplowitz, Note, "IDidn't Agree to Arbitrate That!"-How Courts Determine if
Employees' Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Claims Fall Within the Scope of Broad
MandatoryArbitration Clauses, 13 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 565, 572 (2012).
99.
S.2915
Rape
Victims
Act
of
2009,
CONGRESS.Gov,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/11 lth-congress/senate-bill/2915/actions
[https://perma.cc/G455LZ6Y] (last visited Sept. 9, 2018).
100.
See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (citing Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
101.
See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878, 113th Cong. (2013); Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Congress (2009).
102.
S. 878; H.R. 1020.
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the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013 expired with the close of the 113th
Congress in 2014.103
3. Currently Proposed Legislation to Limit the Scope of the FAA
a. The ArbitrationFairnessAct
On March 7, 2017, Senator Franken and Representative Hank
Johnson re-introduced the Arbitration Fairness Act.' 0 4 The goal of the
Arbitration Fairness Act is to ensure access to meaningful legal
recourse by eliminating predispute forced, binding arbitration clauses
in employment, consumer, civil rights, and antitrust cases.10 5
Interestingly, the bill exempts arbitration provisions pursuant to
collective bargaining agreements, although it further clarifies that
arbitration agreements cannot force an employee to waive his or her
rights under the US Constitution, a state constitution, a federal or state
statute, or related public policy. 106 In a press release, Representative
Johnson emphasized that forced arbitration undermines the
Constitution's fundamental protections. 10 7 Senator Patrick Leahy
further condemned the lack of clear notice given to signatories.10 8 He
noted that most employees are unaware of binding arbitration clauses
hidden in their employment contracts, which result in forcing
individuals "to face wealthy corporations behind closed-doors" without
the opportunity for meaningful judicial review. 109
According to the Arbitration Fairness Act's sponsors, the FAA's
legislative history demonstrates that it was "intended to target
commercial arbitration agreements between two companies of generally
comparable bargaining power," rather than arbitration agreements
between employers and employees. 1 0 The sponsors argue that the
Supreme Court has erroneously broadened the scope of the FAA well
CONGRESS.GOV,
2009,
of
Arbitration Fairness Act
1020
H.R.
103.
https://www.congress.gov/bill/ 11 ith-congress/house-bill/1020/all-actions [https://perma.cc/H2BHG35D] (last visited Sept. 9, 2018); S.878 - Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, CONGRESS.Gov,
[https://perma.cc/6FGAhttps://www.congress.gov/bil /113th-congress/senate-bill/878/all-actions
QQPJ] (last visited Sept. 9, 2018);
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, 115th Congress (2017); Arbitration
104.
Fairness Act of 2017, S.537, 115th Congress § 402 (2017).
Press Release, Rep. Hank Johnson, Sen. Al Franken and Rep. Hank Johnson Lead
105.
2017),
7,
(Mar.
Agreements
Arbitration
Forced
Unfair
End
to
Fight
https://hankjohnson.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/sen-al-franken-and-rep-hankjohnson-lead-fight-end-unfair-forced [https://perma.cc/PZ4R-E2UC].
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, S. 537, 115th Congress § 402(b)(2) (2017-2018).
106.
Press Release, Rep. Hank Johnson, supra note 105.
107.
Id.
108.
Id.
109.
110.
Id.
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beyond its original purpose.1 1 1 The Arbitration Fairness Act, its
proponents argue, will reflect the drafters' original intent by allowing
parties entering into agreements to arbitrate only after the dispute has
arisen. 112 By facilitating a voluntary-rather than mandatory-system
of arbitration, workers would have a meaningful choice regarding how
to proceed once a claim arises. 113
b. The Ending ForcedArbitrationof Sexual HarassmentAct
On December 6, 2017, a bipartisan group of lawmakers 11 4
introduced legislation aimed at eliminating forced arbitration of
workplace sexual harassment and sex discrimination claims."' The
bill, titled the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of
2017, provides that "no predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid
or enforceable if it requires arbitration of a sex discrimination
dispute."11 6 The bill defines the term "sex discrimination dispute" as
follows:
[A] dispute between an employer and employee arising out of conduct that would
form the basis of a claim based on sex under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.) if the employment were employment by an employer
(as defined in section 701(b) of that Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e(b))), regardless of
whether a violation of such title VII is alleged.117

As currently drafted, the bill "prohibit[s] employers from
enforcing arbitration agreements with respect to employee allegations
of workplace sexual harassment or any claim of gender discrimination"
that could be raised under Title VII.118 The bill also allows binding
arbitration provisions in CBAs, provided that they do not have the effect
of "waiving the right of an employee to seek judicial enforcement of a
right arising under a provision of the Constitution of the United States,

111.
Id.
112.
Id.
Id.
113.
114.
The bill's sponsors are Representatives Cheri Bustos (D-Ill.) and Senator Kirsten
Gillibrand (D-N.Y.). Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017, H.R. 4570,
115th Cong. (2017); Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017, S. 2203, 115th
Cong. (2017). A later version of the House bill was introduced on December 26, 2017. See H.R.
4734, 115th Cong. (2017).
115.
Jessica Guynn, 'Enough Is Enough': Gretchen Carlson Says Bill Ending Arbitration
Would Break Silence in Sexual Harassment Cases, USA TODAY (Dec. 6, 2017, 7:17 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/12/06/bipartisan-bill-would-eliminate-forcedarbitration-break-silence-sexual-harassment-cases/925226001/ [https://perma.cc/2U6G-4UPC].
116.
H.R. 4734; S. 2203.
117.
H.R. 4734; S. 2203.
118.
Dudek, supra note 19.
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a State Constitution, a Federal or State statute, or public policy arising
therefrom." 119
The proper interpretation of the proposed bill is not completely
clear: some believe that it would mandate litigation of any sexual
harassment claims, 120 whereas others believe that it would allow
employees to choose whether to litigate or instead submit their claims
to arbitration. 121 The bill summary, authored by the Congressional
Research Service, states that the bill "prohibits a predispute arbitration
agreement from being valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of a
sex discrimination dispute," which implies that if an arbitration
agreement contains an offending clause, the entire agreement could be
deemed unenforceable. 12 2
Although the bill was designed to address concerns about sexual
harassment in the workplace, the broad language of the bill may have
unintended and far-reaching consequences. 1 2 3 As currently written, it
is unclear whether courts are granted the power to invalidate
arbitration solely as it relates to claims of sexual harassment, or if they
would be able to invalidate entire arbitration agreements. 12 4 Under the
latter interpretation, existing employment arbitration agreements may
be in jeopardy of being completely unenforceable in the event of any
employer-employee dispute. 125 Critics are concerned that the bill may
thus drastically alter employment litigation by completely eradicating
and
employers
agreements between
arbitration
predispute
126
employees.
Less than two weeks after the bill was introduced, Microsoft
became the first Fortune 100 Company to endorse the legislation. 127

S. 2203.
119.
See Joe Liburt, Allison Riechert Giese & Akasha Perez, The EndingForcedArbitration
120.
of Sexual Harassment Act: A Legislative Response to #MeToo, ORRICK: EMP. L. & LITIG. (Dec. 14,
https://blogs.orrick.com/employment/2017/12/14/the-ending-forced-arbitration-of-sexual2017),
harassment-act-a-legislative-response-to-metoo/ [https://perma.cc/9WQH-SRTN].
See Guynn, supra note 115.
121.
S. 2203 - Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017,
122.
https://www.congress.gov/billI/115th-congress/senate-bill/2203/all-actions
CONGRESS.Gov,
[https://perma.cc/EB8W-TXU8] (last visited Oct. 7, 2018). Although the bill summary itself would
not be enacted, it demonstrates the ambiguity surrounding the Act's language.
See Dudek, supra note 19.
123.
Id.
124.
Id.
125.
Michael Campbell, The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act May
126.
Apply to More than Sexual Harassment, SHEPPARD MULLIN: LAB. & EMP. L. BLOG (Dec. 22, 2017),
https://www.laboremploymentlawblog.com/2017/12/articles/uncategorized/
pre-dispute/ [https://perma.cc/FZH7-2GKX].
127.
Brad Smith, Microsoft Endorses Senate Bill to Address Sexual Harassment,
MICROSOFT (Dec. 19, 2017), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/microsoftendorses-senate-bill-address-sexual-harassment/ [https://perma.cc/946V-5TDG].
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Recognizing the tension between supporting the legislation and
requiring its own employees to arbitrate sexual harassment claims, the
company simultaneously ended its own requirement that employees'
sexual harassment claims be subject to binding arbitration. 128
Similarly, in May of 2018, Uber announced that it would eliminate
forced arbitration for riders, drivers, or administrative employees who
allege any claims of sexual assault or harassment. 129 In explaining
Uber's decision to the media, its Chief Legal Officer cited the
importance of allowing a victim of sexual violence to seek redress in the
venue of his or her choice, given the "uniquely personal and difficult set
of claims." 130 Just hours after Uber's announcement, Lyft ended its own
policy of forcing sexual assault victims into binding arbitration and
stated that it would no longer require confidentiality agreements as
conditions of settlement. 131 The speed of these respective eliminations
demonstrates the viability of excluding sexual violence claims from
binding arbitration agreements. 132
As of this writing, the House version of the bill has been referred
to the Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust
Law.133 The Senate version of the bill has been referred to the
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. 13 4

128.
Harper Neidig, Microsoft Backs Bill to End ForcedArbitrationfor Sexual Harassment
Claims, HILL (Dec. 19, 2017, 10:15 AM), http://www.thehill.com/policy/technology/365583microsoft-backs-bill-that-would-end-forced-arbitration-for-sexual [https://perma.cc/S8X3-9UAT].
129.
Johana Bhuiyan, Uber Will Now Allow Riders, Drivers and Employees to Pursue
Individual Claims of Sexual Assault in Open Court, RECODE (May 15, 2018, 6:00 AM),
https://www.recode.net/2018/5/15/17353978/uber-lawsuit-sexual-assault-arbitration-open-court
[https://perma.cc/6GH4-MAXX]. Uber also stated that, notwithstanding the amount of settlement
agreements, it will waive any confidentiality requirement for those who settle claims of sexual
violence against the company. Id. In an additional effort to promote transparency within the
organization, Uber will now also publish a safety report of the cases of sexual assault reported to
Uber. Id.
130.
Id. (quoting Tony West, Uber's Chief Legal Officer) ("We've heard over and over from
the dozens of advocacy groups we've spoken with that few experiences deprive an individual of
control more than sexual assault or sexual harassment. And we've heard what's most important
is for us to restore some sense of control to survivors.").
131.
Sara Ashley O'Brien, Lyft Joins Uber to End Forced Arbitration for Sexual Assault
Victims, CNN (May 15, 2018, 3:03 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/05/15/technology/lyft-forcedarbitration/index.html [https://perma.cc/6XU2-GJRT].
132.
The Author acknowledges that Microsoft, Uber, and Lyft are wealthy companies that
can easily absorb the costs of litigation resulting from eliminating forced arbitration of sexually
based claims, whereas smaller companies with less funds may face additional challenges.
133.
H.R. 4734 - Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017,
CONGREss.GOv,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/4734/all-actions
[https://perma.cc/R7WJ-78DW] (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
134.
S. 2203 - Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual HarassmentAct of 2017, supra note
122. Additionally, the Senate is active in its pursuits to eliminate sexual harassment in the
workplace. See Guynn, supra note 115. In November 2017, the Senate passed a resolution
requiring sexual harassment training for senators and staff. S. Res. 330, 115th Cong. (2017). In
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D. Public Response to Mandatory Arbitrationof Sexual ClaimsHollywood Scandals and the Serial Abuser Who Incited a Movement
1. Gretchen Carlson and the Power of Celebrity
Workplace sexual harassment in Hollywood first became a
national topic of conversation when Fox News commentator Gretchen
Carlson sued her boss, Roger Ailes, the cofounder, CEO, and chairman
of Fox. 135 Carlson was allegedly terminated by Fox News after her show
received poor ratings in a viewer bracket that was particularly
important to advertisers. 1 36 In her complaint, however, Carlson alleged
that Ailes made sexual advances toward her, and then fired her because
she complained about the harassment. 137 Ailes's lawyers tried to
compel the case into arbitration, arguing that Carlson broke the terms
of her employment contract by attempting to bring her claims in
court.13 8

Carlson's

employment contract

contained the following

binding arbitration clause: "Any controversy, claim or dispute arising
out of or relating to this Agreement or [Carlson's] employment shall be
brought before a mutually selected three-member arbitration panel and
held in New York City . . .. "139 Carlson circumvented this clause by
suing Ailes directly, rather than suing Fox itself.140 Carlson's public
allegations ultimately prompted six additional women to speak out
publicly, stating that Ailes had sexually harassed them as well. 141 By

May 2018, the Senate passed a bill to reform the congressional complaint process in an effort to
provide better protections for accusers. S. 2952, 115th Cong. (2018).
See John Koblin, Gretchen Carlson,Former Fox Anchor, Speaks Publicly About Sexual
135.
2016),
12,
(July
TIMES
N.Y.
Lawsuit,
Harassment
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/business/medialgretchen-carlson-fox-news-

interview.html? r=0 [https://perma.cc/SQN4-QPZP]; Martin, supra note 17; Erik Ortiz, Roger
Ailes, Former Fox News CEO and Founder, Dies at 77, NBC NEWS (May 18, 2017, 7:48 AM),
https://www.nbenews.com/news/us-news/fox-news-ex-ceo-roger-ailes-dead-reports-say-n7

6

1

45

1

[https://perma.cc/2TQV-Q6H3].
Koblin, supra note 135.
136.
Elizabeth Dias & Eliana Dockterman, The Teeny Tiny Fine Print That Can Allow
137.
2016),
21,
(Oct.
TIME
Go
Unheard,
to
Claims
Harassment
Sexual
http://time.com/4540111/arbitration-clauses-sexual-harassment/ [https://perma.cc/JXQ3-H6RE].
Erik Wemple, Roger Ailes Opts for Secrecy, Cowardice in Face of Gretchen Carlson
138.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik2016),
9,
(July
POST
WASH.
Suit,
wemple/wp/2016/07/09/roger-ailes-opts-for-secrecy-cowardice-in-face-of-gretchen-carlsonsuit/?utm.term=.b23dbd35d3d3 [https://perma.cc/N83R-JVNF].
Id.
139.
Id. In response to Carlson's case, Democratic Senator Richard Blumenthal opined
140.
that, "[i]f Ms. Carlson had adhered strictly to the terms of her employment contract, her case would
have remained a secret forever." Dias & Dockterman, supra note 137.

Koblin, supra note 135. In a similar manner, it was revealed that at least five women
141.
accused Dov Charney, the founder and chief executive of American Apparel, of sexual harassment,
when four of the five women sued to invalidate their arbitration clauses. See Martin, supra note
17.
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bringing the alleged harassment into the public domain, Carlson
became a huge threat to Fox, and the company quickly moved to resolve
the matter. 142 The case settled for $20 million and a public apology, and
Ailes resigned within two weeks after an investigation into his behavior
began. 143 Upon his resignation, Ailes reportedly received $40 millionthe full amount due for the balance of his contract term, which ran
through 2018.144 As Carlson's story demonstrates, publicly "sharing a
story in court can be a powerful way to make change-but few of us
have Carlson's celebrity and influence to pull it off." 14 5

2. Harvey Weinstein-The Spark That Incited a Movement
Perhaps the most infamous recent sexual assault scandal
involved producer Harvey Weinstein, whose own company fired him
following allegations of sexual harassment, assault, and rape.1 4 6
Although he denied all accusations, eighty-seven women have come
forward to speak out at the time of this writing. 147 Since the allegations
regarding Weinstein first surfaced in October of 2017, 140 public
figures-most within Hollywood-have been accused of sexual
misconduct.1 4 8 This figure continues to grow, as the list is updated

142.
Id.
143.
Id.; Joe Flint, Roger Ailes Steps Down from Fox News with $40 Million Exit Package,
WALL STREET J. (July 21, 2016, 7:22 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/roger-ailes-stepsdown-from-fox-news-with-40-million-exit-package-2016-07-21 [https://perma.cc/HMM5-NETW].
144.
Flint, supra note 143; Reid Nakamura, Details of Roger Ailes' $40 Million Deal to Exit
Fox News, THE WRAP (July 21, 2016, 6:09 PM), https://www.thewrap.com/details-of-roger-ailes-40million-deal-to-exit-fox-news/ [https://perma.cc/45N8-MSAG].
145.
See Martin, supra note 17.
146.
For a complete timeline of the scandal involving Harvey Weinstein, see Harvey
Weinstein Timeline: How the Scandal Unfolded, BBC NEWS (May 25, 2018),
http://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-41594672 [https://perma.cc/J7GT-KEV7].
147.
Sara M. Moniuszko & Cara Kelly, Harvey Weinstein Scandal: A Complete List of the
87
Accusers,
USA
TODAY
(June
1,
2018,
4:51
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/storyllife/people/2017/10/27/weinstein-scandal-complete-istaccusers/804663001/ [https://perma.cc/F2KE-9EK9]. Note that numerous other allegations against
powerful men in Hollywood arose before and after the Harvey Weinstein scandal. For details
regarding the investigation detailing how Fox News anchor Bill O'Reilly settled allegations of
sexual misconduct with five women for $13 million, see Ricardo Lopez, CaliforniaLawmaker Calls
for Ban on Secret Settlements for Sexual Harassment, VARIETY (Oct. 18, 2017, 4:46 PM),
http://variety.com/2017/biz/news/bill-settlement-ban-sexual-harassment-harvey-weinstein1202593778/ [https://perma.cc/6X94-GQUQ]. In late 2017, numerous allegations of sexual assault
and misconduct were made against actor Kevin Spacey. For a list of the accusations made against
Kevin Spacey, see Maria Puente, Kevin Spacey Scandal:A Complete List of the 15 Accusers, USA
TODAY (Nov. 16, 2017, 12:04 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/2017/11/07/kevin-spaceyscandal-complete-list-13-accusers/835739001/ [https://perma.c/3VBU-8L7V].
148.
Samantha Cooney, Here Are All the Public Figures Who've Been Accused of Sexual
Misconduct
After
Harvey
Weinstein,
TIME
(Sept.
13,
2018,
9:28
AM),
http://time.com/5015204/harvey-weinstein-scandal/ [https://perma.cclUCZ4-9WZJ].
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nearly on a daily basis. 1 4 9 The scandal sparked a national conversation
about sexual misconduct and sexual assault and breathed new life into
the #MeToo movement.1 5 0

On January 1, 2018, The New York Times announced the Time's
Up legal defense fund-an antiharassment initiative founded by
powerful women in Hollywood. 15 1 The initiative aims to counter
systemic sexual harassment not only in Hollywood, but also in bluecollar workplaces across the country. 152 In just two months, the
initiative's legal defense fund garnered $21 million in donations to help
"provide[] subsidized legal services for individuals subjected to
Time's Up is also
workplace sexual harassment and abuse." 15 3
currently working on legislation to "penalize companies that tolerate
persistent harassment, and to discourage the use of nondisclosure
agreements

to silence

victims." 1 54

Hundreds

of celebrities

and

politicians have worn Time's Up pins to a variety of major events in
2018-including the Golden Globes, Grammy Awards, BAFTA Film
Awards, women's marches, and the State of the Union-to demonstrate
support for the initiative. 15 5

149.
Id.
For further discussion of the #MeToo movement, see France, supra note 3. TIME
150.
Magazine awarded its 2017 Person of the Year award to "The Silence Breakers," who were defined
as those "whom had summoned extraordinary personal courage to speak out about sexual

harassment at their jobs." See Stephanie Zacharek, Eliana Dockterman & Haley Sweetland
Edwards, TIME Person of the Year 2017: The Silence Breakers, TIME, http://time.com/time-personof-the-year-20 17-silence-breakers/ [https://perma.cc/Q68Z-S3ET] (last visited Oct. 6, 2018).
Cara Buckley, Powerful Hollywood Women Unveil Anti-HarassmentAction Plan, N.Y.
151.
TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018),

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/movies/times-up-hollywood-women-

sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/4W2A-A8EA].
Id.
152.
Alix Langone, #MeToo and Time's Up Founders Explain the Difference Between the 2
153.
PM),
2018,
5:21
8,
(Mar.
TIME
Alike,
How
They're
And
Movements
http://time.com/5189945/whats-the-difference-between-the-metoo-and-times-up-movements
https://www.timesupnow.com/home
UP,
TIME'S
[https://perma.cc/2BLJ-XCMW];
[https://perma.cc/53YD-3MTP] (last visited Oct. 6, 2018).
Buckley, supra note 151. For further discussion regarding the use of nondisclosure
154.
agreements in the context of sexual assault and sexual harassment claims, see infra Section

III.A.2.c.
Claire Coghlan, How Hollywood, Award Shows Helped Expand Time's Up into a
155.
Worldwide Cause, VARIETY (Mar. 1, 2018, 8:00 AM), http://variety.com/2018/biz/news/times-upmetoo-hollywood-oscars-1202713699/ [https://perma.cc/J6D6-RKSY].

360

VAND. J ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 21:1:339

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Merits of Binding Arbitration Within Employment Contracts
1. Benefits of Binding Arbitration
Generally, binding arbitration is lauded for its efficiency.156 In
the absence of unlimited judicial resources, arbitration keeps many
employer-employee disputes out of an already overworked judicial
system. 15 7 Arbitrators often have specialized knowledge, primarily "to
the law of the shop" regarding the employer's industry. 15 8 This
familiarity with industry norms can be beneficial for both parties, as
this specialized knowledge may lead to a more finetuned, well-reasoned
judgment.1 5 9
Arbitration is generally more informal and less thorough than
the judicial fact-finding process.1 6 0 Civil trial procedures, such as
discovery, cross-examination, and rules of evidence, are limited in scope
or do not apply. 161 However, these informalities make arbitration much
faster and less expensive than a civil lawsuit. 16 2 Additionally,
arbitration decisions are almost impossible to appeal, thus providing
concrete finality for both parties. 163
Beyond efficiency, one of arbitration's greatest strengths lies in
its privacy, which can benefit both employers and employees. 164
Employees generally want to continue working in the same industry
after getting into a dispute with their employers. 165 Thus, these
employees are wary of coming forward in a public setting, such as a
156.

See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 11, at 13.

157.
Norman J. Wiener, Is Arbitration an Answer?, 15 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 449, 449
(1982).
158.
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-83
(1960).
159.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974).
160.
Id. at 57-58.
161.
Id.; see also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956)
("Arbitration carries no right to trial by jury that is guaranteed ... by the Seventh Amendment
.... Arbitrators do not have the benefit of judicial instruction on the law; they need not give their
reasons for their results; the record of their proceedings is not as complete as it is in a court trial;
and judicial review of an award is more limited than judicial review of a trial."); Wilko v. Swan,
346 U.S., 427, 435-38 (1953).
162.
Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 58.
163.
See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 11, at 3.
164.
See 5Benefits ofArbitrationas an ADR Method, PROWSE CHOWNE LLP (July 24, 2017),
https://prowsechowne.com/benefits-of-arbitration-as-an-adr-method/
[https://perma.cc/JEZ68UBK].
165.
See S.M., How Non-Disclosure Agreements Can Protect Workplace Abusers,
ECONOMIST (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2017/10/
we-did-not-know [https://perma.cc/73QE-EZHS].
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court, because they fear employers will view them as litigious or
difficult. 166 In the sexual harassment context, fear of retaliationincluding damage to one's career and reputation-often dissuades
As stated by an attorney who
victims from coming forward. 167
represented women in sexual harassment cases for over thirty years,
"Of all the women I know who have publicly complained, not one is
working in her chosen career today." 1 6 8 Victims of sexual misconduct in
the workplace often bear insurmountable personal 1 69 and professional
costs if they wish to come forward in a public setting. 170 Arbitration
provides a private forum for these potential plaintiffs, in which they are
not required to publicly air their grievances. Proponents of binding
arbitration argue that this enables victims to address and resolve
claims that may otherwise remain unheard. 171
2. Drawbacks of Binding Arbitration
Although arbitration proceedings are generally less expensive
and offer greater privacy than a lawsuit, the lack of formal rights and
procedures drastically undermine the integrity of the dispute resolution
process. 172 The Supreme Court has recognized that "arbitrators have
173
no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award."
Additionally, the payouts in arbitration tend to be smaller than the
damages plaintiffs may receive in court. 174 On average, employees and
consumers prevail less often and receive much lower damages in

166.
167.
retaliation
workplace
report the

See id.
FELDBLUM & LiPNIC, supra note 5, at 16-17. According to the EEOC, this fear of
is well-founded: a 2003 study found that 75 percent of employees who reported
mistreatment were retaliated against in some form. Id. Employees generally fail to
offending behavior due to fears of hostility and reprisal, as well as organizational

indifference or trivialization. See id.
168.

CARLSON, supra note 1, at 7.

See Haley Miles-Mclean et al., "Stop Looking at Me!": Interpersonal Sexual
169.
Objectification as a Source of Insidious Trauma, 39 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 363, 369-70 (2015).
Studies have shown that sexual harassment can be classified as "insidious trauma" in which small,
everyday discriminatory events lead to cumulative trauma over time. See id. Gretchen Carlson

described the related phenomenon of victim shaming as follows: "Here's the way it works: You are
shamed .... [Tiherefore you are ashamed." CARLSON, supra note 168, at 12.
170.

See e.g., FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 5, at 16-17.

See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 11, at 26. The EEOC estimates that between 87 and
171.
94 percent of individuals who experience workplace harassment do not file a formal complaint.
FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 5, at 16. For a more detailed review of reporting norms in the

workplace, see Lilia M. Cortina & Jennifer L. Berdahl, Sexual Harassment in Organizations:A
Decade of Research in Review, in 1 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 469, 469-

96 (Julian Barling & Cary L. Cooper eds., 2008).
See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 11, at 3-4.
172.
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960).
173.
174.
Dias & Dockterman, supra note 137.
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arbitration than they do in court.1 75 Further, data indicates that the
vast majority of arbitrators are men.17 6
Overall, arbitration is often biased against the employee.17 7
There are multiple factors that account for this phenomenon, including
a potential lack of arbitrator impartiality.17 8 Often, arbitration clauses
will contain language that allows the employer to unilaterally choose
the arbitrator. 179 Further, "employers tend to win cases more often
when they appear before the same arbitrator in multiple cases,
indicating that they have a 'repeat-player advantage' over employees"
stemming from consistent involvement in arbitration.1 8 0
Beyond a potentially biased arbitrator, arbitration poses yet
another hurdle to employees-lack of access to evidence. 181 Companies
have access to corporate documents and records that the employee does

175.
See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 11163, at 17-19; Dias & Dockterman, supra note
137. A study found that employees in mandatory arbitration recover only approximately 21.4
percent of the time, which is only 59 percent as often as in federal courts and 38 percent as often
as in state courts. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 11, at 19. A 2007 Chicago-wide survey found
that median sexual harassment settlements were roughly $30,000, compared to a national study
from a researcher at Columbia University in 2006, which found that employees who take their
case to trial win $217,000 on average. Dias & Dockterman, supranote 137 (citing Minna J. Kotkin,
Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of Confidential Employment DiscriminationSettlements,
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111 (2007)).
176.
Stephanie J. Ball, Ending Gender and Minority Bias in ADR Selection Through
Education, NAT'L ARB. & MEDIATION (Nov. 2017), http://www.namadr.com/publications/ending-

gender-and-minority-bias-in-adr-selection-through-education/ [https://perma.ce/5WDF-GEU2]. A
2014 ABA Dispute Resolution Section survey found that for cases with between one and ten million
dollars at issue, 89 percent of arbitrators were men. Id. (citing Gina Viola Brown & Andrea Kupfer
Schneider, Gender Differences in Dispute Resolution Practice:Report on the ABA Section of Dispute
Resolution Practice Snapshot Survey (Marquette Univ. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper
Series, Research Paper No. 14-04, 2014)). A 2016 study found that female arbitrators were involved
in only 4 percent of cases involving one billion dollars or more. Ball, supra (citing Christine
Simmons, Where Are the Women and Minorities in Global Dispute Resolution?, AM. LAWYER,
https://www.law.comlamericanlawyer/almlID/1202769481566/?slreturn=20180907222307
[https://perma.cclXB22-MUV5] (last visited Oct. 7, 2018)). Data indicates that men struggle with
understanding the gravity of sexual harassment claims made by women, as an online survey of
750 men indicated that two out of three respondents "did not think that repeated, unwanted
invitations to drinks, dinner, or dates is sexual harassment." Brionna Lewis, 1 in 3 Men Don't
Think Catcalling is Sexual Harassment, INSTAMOTOR, https://instamotor.com/blog/1-in- 3-mendont-think-catcalling-is-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/HJ8V-EG38] (last visited Sept. 12,
2018). Further, one in five respondents believed that sexual harassment should not be a fireable
offense. Id.
177.
See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 11163, at 23.
178.
See id. at 18-20.
179.
Id. at 17.
180.
Id. at 3. One study discovered that "the first time an employer appeared before an
arbitrator, the employee had a 17.9 percent chance of winning ... and after 25 cases before the
same arbitrator the employee's chance of winning dropped to only 4.5 percent." Id. at 23 (citing
Alexander Colvin & Mark D. Gough, Individual Employment Rights Arbitration in the United
States: Actors and Outcomes, 68 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 1019 (2015)).
181.
See id. at 3-4.

2018]

ARBITRATION OF SEKUAL VIOLENCE CLAIMS

363

not have access to outside of the formal discovery process. 18 2
Arbitration proceedings do not provide for a mandatory discovery
process akin to that of a civil lawsuit, so often the employee must
overcome a significant amount of information asymmetry.1 8 3
Perhaps most importantly, most employees do not have the
option to negotiate their arbitration agreements. 184 The general
disparity in bargaining power between employers and employees often
enables employers to unilaterally dictate employment terms.18 5 In
certain industries, employees are viewed as a disposable commodityif an employee attempts to negotiate contractual terms, there are
hundreds, if not thousands, of others lining up for the offered
position. 186 According to the basic principles of supply and demand,
companies are thus able to require their employees to sign contracts of
adhesion that include mandatory arbitration provisions.1 8 7 Employees
are then faced with a take-it-or-leave-it offer: either sign on the dotted
line or forgo the job entirely.18 8 Although most employees choose to sign
employment contracts that contain mandatory arbitration provisions,
they often do so without full knowledge of the rights being waived.18 9
This is due in part to a lack of clear notice, as courts have held that
individuals do not have to actually sign anything to be bound by a
binding arbitration clause.19 0

182.
See id.
See H.C., What Is Information Asymmetry?, ECONOMIST (Sept. 5, 2016),
183.
https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2016/09/04/what-is-information-asymmetry
[https://perma.cc/T8WW-3FAU].
184.

See Robert J. Landry & Benjamin Hardy, Mandatory Pre-Employment Arbitration

Agreements: The Scattering, Smothering and Covering of Employee Rights, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 479, 494 (2008); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration:Is It Just?, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 1631, 1656, 1660 (2005); Catherine Riley, Note, Signing in Glitter or Blood?:
Unconscionabilityand Reality Television Contracts, 18 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 107, 11213 (2013).
See generally Daniel D. Barnhizer, Foreword:Power, Inequality and the Bargain:The
185.
Role of BargainingPower in the Law of Contract - Symposium Introduction, 2006 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 841 (2006).
See, e.g., Riley, supra note 184, at 112-13.
186.
Id. at 136. For a discussion of why courts are hesitant to deem these contracts
187.
unconscionable, see generally id. at 117-23.
Perkins, supra note 13.
188.
189.
Id.
Dias & Dockterman, supra note 137. For example, Netflix subscribers agree to
190.
arbitration in the terms of use before picking a movie, and Macy's employees waive certain rights

in the materials that are given upon acceptance of the job. Id.
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B. Binding Arbitrationand Sexual Violence-A Dangerous
Combination
1. The Costs of Sexual Violence in the Workplace
Sexual assault and harassment within the workplace have a
significant impact on employees' health and well-being, proving costly
to employers and society as a whole. 191 The government loses
approximately $100 million per year in actual and productivity costs as
a result of sexual harassment in the workplace. 192 The US Department
of Labor "estimates that American businesses lose almost $1 billion
annually from absenteeism, low morale, and new employee training
replacement costs due to sexual harassment." 193 These costs also
include direct expenditures for victims' health care and increased
employee turnover. 194 Harassment can further harm an organization's
bottom line in the form of workers' compensation claims, as evidence
shows that exposure to workplace harassment increases risk for illness
and injury. 195 The financial risk that sexual harassment poses to a
company cannot be understated; companies collectively paid over $2
billion in employment practices liability insurance (EPLI) premiums in
2016 to help mitigate this risk. 196
Harassment in the workplace leads to indirect adverse
consequences for the employer. When workers experience harassment
directly, it can lead to adverse effects, such as distress and disruption. 197
However, harassment impacts more than just the victim-witnesses of
workplace harassment may feel that the workplace is both unsafe and
unfair, which can lead\.to workplace conflicts. 198 Additionally, an
employee's perception that his or her organization is tolerant of sexual

191.
Harned et al., supra note 8, at 175.
192.
Fitzgerald, supra note 5, at 1071.
193.
Elissa L. Perry, Carol T. Kulik, & Anne C. Bourhis, The Reasonable Woman Standard:
Effects on Sexual Harassment Court Decisions, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 9, 9 (2004).
194.
See Harned et al., supra note 8, at 175-76.
195.
Kathleen M. Rospenda et al., Is Workplace HarassmentHazardous to Your Health?,
20 J. Bus. & PSYCHOL. 95, 107 (2005).
196.
Rachel Gillet, Sexual HarassmentIsn't a Hollywood, Tech, or Media Issue - It Affects
Everyone, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 30, 2017, 10:49 AM), www.businessinsider.com/
sexual-harassment-affects-nearly-everyone-2017-11 [https://perma.cc/9KS6-HJ7E].
197.
Jeanne Murphy et al., "They Talk Like That, But We Keep Working": Sexual
Harassment and Sexual Assault Experiences Among Mexican Indigenous Farmworker Women in
Oregon, 17 J. IMMIGRANT MINORITY HEALTH 1834, 1838 (2015).
198.
Id.
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harassment leads to a decrease in job satisfaction. 199 A decrease in job
satisfaction, in turn, leads to a decrease in employee productivity. 2 00
Beyond an individual's decreased job satisfaction, he or she may
be subjected to adverse employment actions as a direct result of filing a
complaint. 20 1 A study "reported that fully 50% of the women who filed
a complaint with the state of California were fired; another 25%
resigned due to the stresses of the complaint process or the harassment
itself." 2 02 These actions further compound the turnover costs faced by
the employer.
2. Forced Arbitration of Sexual Violence Claims-Further
Complications
When combined with confidentiality agreements, mandatory
arbitration clauses provide a shield for employers-especially serial
sexual abusers-to minimize liability and continue abusive practices. 203
Many serial predators are "able to skirt years and sometimes decades
of allegations of sexual harassment or assault through the use of
settlements or contracts that included nondisclosure agreements." 204
For example, Olympic gold medalist McKayla Maroney recently wrote
a victim-impact statement regarding sexual abuse she suffered by
former USA Gymnastics team doctor, Larry Nassar. 205 Maroney first
spoke out about the abuse via social media in October 2017.206 Her

Harned et al., supra note 8, at 176.
199.
Id. at 176-80. An analysis of 22,372 military women demonstrates the potential
200.
consequences not only for victims, but for the workforce overall. Id. at 180 ("[o]f the 22,372 women
sampled, 941 (4.2 percent) reported an experience of sexual assault by workplace personnel" and
a staggering "16,204 (72.4 percent) experienced other types of sexual harassment" within the
previous 12 months). Id. Out of the 941 women who reported being sexually assaulted, only 20
percent filed a formal complaint, while 32 percent considered leaving military service altogether.
Id. Of the 16,204 women who reported being sexually harassed, only 4 percent filed a formal
complaint, while 23 percent considered leaving the military. Id.
See Fitzgerald, supra note 5, at 1072.
201.
Id.
202.
203.
Perkins, supra note 13.
204.
James Rufus Koren, Weinstein Scandal Puts Nondisclosure Agreements in the
Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2017, 6:15 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-weinsteinnondisclosure-agreements-20171023-story.html [https://perma.ce/BF42-GMSY].
Abigail Abrams, 'I Thought I Was Going to Die': Read McKayla Maroney's Full Victim
205.
Impact Statement in Larry Nassar Trial, TIME (Jan. 19, 2018), http://time.com/5109011/mckaylamaroney-larry-nassar-victim-impact-statement/ [https://perma.cc/DF3Y-NG3V]. In November of
2017, Nassar pled guilty to seven counts of criminal sexual contact with underage girls. Id. In
Maroney's statement, she emphasized the complicity of three major institutions-USA
Gymnastics, the United States Olympic Committee, and Michigan State University-in
perpetuating Nassar's behavior by failing to respond to numerous complaints. Id.
Alice Park & Billy Perrigo, 'It Started When I Was 13 Years Old.' Olympic Gymnast
206.
McKayla Maroney Says U.S. Team Doctor Molested Her, TIME (Oct. 18, 2017, 11:59 AM),
http://time.com/4987066/mckayla- maroney-metoo-molested/.

366

VAND. J ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 21:1:339

statement was read aloud in open court during Nassar's sentencing
hearing in January 2018, despite the fact that she previously executed
a confidentiality agreement with USA Gymnastics as part of a $1.25
million settlement. 207 According to the confidentiality agreement, USA
Gymnastics could pursue a monetary penalty of $100,000 if Maroney
publicly discussed the abuse allegations. 208 After severe public
backlash, including multiple celebrities offering to pay Maroney's fine,
USA Gymnastics released a statement that is "has not sought and will
not seek any money from McKayla Maroney for her brave statements
made in describing her victimization and abuse by Larry Nassar." 20 9
However, the average nondisclosure agreement signatory is not
an Olympic athlete. 210 Most victims of workplace harassment or assault
simply do not have large enough public personas to garner the type of
public outcry that McKayla Maroney's story triggered-public outcry
that ultimately allowed Maroney to escape rigid contractual
obligations. 21 1
Most employees lack meaningful bargaining power when it
comes to negotiating the terms of their employment agreements,
including clauses related to mandatory arbitration. 2 12 In particular,
individuals in low-wage jobs "have the least leverage to push back
against forced arbitration," yet simultaneously "experience sexual
harassment at disproportionately high rates." 213 For instance, women
working in the restaurant industry, who are subject to a federal
minimum wage of only $2.13 due to their status as tipped employees, 214
are particularly vulnerable to workplace harassment. 2 15 Although only
7 percent of US women work in the restaurant industry, nearly 37
percent of all sexual harassment complaints made to the Equal

207.

Abrams, supra note 205.

208.
Alice Park, McKayla Maroney Won't Be Fined for Speaking Out About Sexual Abuse,
USA Gymnastics Says, TIME (Jan. 17, 2018), http://time.com/5106664/mckayla-maroney-no-fineusa-gymnastics/ [https://perma.cc/W8PA-ZNDT].
209.
Id.
210.
Id.
211.
Id. See generally Martin, supra note 17.
212.
See supra Section II.A.2.
213.
Martin, supra note 17.
214.
Although the federal minimum wage for non-tipped workers is $7.25 per hour, "[a]n
employer of a tipped employee is only required to pay $2.13 per hour in direct wages if that amount
combined with the tips received at least equals the federal minimum wage." Tips, U.S. DEP'T LAB.,
https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/wages/wagestips [https://perma.cc/GQK5-B6RU] (last visited
Feb. 22, 2018); accord U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C) (2012).
215.
The EEOC identified the restaurant industry as "the 'single largest' source of sexual
harassment claims." See THE REST. OPPORTUNITIES CTRS. UNITED FORWARD TOGETHER, THE
GLASS
FLOOR:
SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
IN
THE
RESTAURANT
INDUSTRY
5
(2014),

http://rocunited.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/10/REPORTTheGlassFloorSexual-Harassment-inthe-Restaurant-Industry.pdf [https://perma.ce/R724-D6CK].
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Employment Opportunity Commission from January to November 2011
came from the restaurant industry.2 16 Studies suggest that this data
still underreports the true rate of sexual harassment, as this behavior
has been normalized within the industry as "kitchen talk."21 7
Poverty has been identified as a key reason why some may
tolerate sexual harassment in the workplace. 218 In a study regarding
indigenous Mexican female farmworkers, many "[w]omen reported
engaging in tactics including ignoring or even pretending to consent to
harassment, worried that reporting the behavior would lead to losing
their jobs." 2 1 9 Study participants were burdened by a desperate need to
work and "linked sexual harassment to threats of losing, or needing to
leave, farm jobs."2 2 0
C. The Current Judicial Frameworkfor Determining Whether a Sexual
Claim Is Arbitrable Under a Binding Arbitration Clause
As the law now stands, claims arising out of sexual harassment
or assault are usually arbitrable under the FAA, depending on the
specific facts of the plaintiffs claim.2 21 Generally, when courts decide
whether to compel a party to arbitrate, they first determine whether
the parties have agreed to arbitrate the dispute based upon (1) whether
there exists a valid agreement to arbitrate and (2) whether the dispute
at issue is within the scope of the arbitration agreement. 222 The
Supreme Court has emphasized that "questions of arbitrability must be
addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration." 223
In order to determine whether a plaintiffs claim is within the
scope of an arbitration clause, courts undergo a fact-specific analysis to
determine whether the plaintiffs factual allegations "relate to" or "arise
out of' his or her employment. 224 This analysis varies among federal
circuits, as there exist two distinct tests: (1) the "but for" test and (2)
the "significant aspects" test. The "but for" test is extremely broad and

216.
217.

Id.
Id. at 1 ("Restaurant workers in focus groups gathered through this study noted that

sexual harassment is 'kitchen talk,' a 'normalized' part of the work environment and that many

restaurant workers are reluctant to publicly acknowledge their experiences with sexual
harassment.").

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Murphy et al., supra note 197, at 1838.
Id. at 1834-35.
Id. at 1838.
See, e.g., Barker v. Halliburton Co., 541 F. Supp. 2d 879 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
Koplowitz, supra note 98, at 572-73.
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
Koplowitz, supra note 98, at 574.
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classifies a claim as arbitrable "if the challenged actions would not have
arisen but for the employer-employee relationship." 22 5 Thus, a plaintiff
in a circuit employing the "but for" test would most likely be forced to
arbitrate a claim involving sexual harassment or assault at work or a
work-related function. 226 To demonstrate, imagine that an actress
working on a film produced by the Weinstein Company wants to bring
a sexual assault claim against Harvey Weinstein. Under the "but for"
test, the actress would be barred from litigating such a claim because
but for her employment, the parties would never have met. On the
other hand, the "significant aspects" test 2 27 analyzes the factual
allegations to determine whether they involved significant aspects of
the employment relationship itself (such as implicating customers or
involving the plaintiffs job performance). 2 2 8 It is less clear when a court.
utilizing the "significant aspects" test would find a plaintiffs claim of
sexual assault or harassment arbitrable.
In order for an employee's sexual assault or harassment claim to
be subject to binding arbitration, the employer must demonstrate that
both parties intended to include such claims in the employment
agreement's arbitration provision. 22 9 Within the employment context,
"[d]etermining the parties' intent with respect to arbitration is
especially difficult. . . because arbitration is not the main subject of the
employment contract." 230 Rather, employees are likely much more
concerned with other terms, such as compensation, hours, or grounds
for termination. 23 1 Additionally, as noted above, many employees sign
employment contracts containing binding arbitration agreements
without truly understanding and, in some cases, having no knowledge
at all of the procedural rights they are waiving. 232 The general disparity
of bargaining power between employers and employees further
increases the difficulty of determining the parties' intent-since many
employees cannot meaningfully bargain for the terms of their
employment contracts, the question of whether an employee's intent to
arbitrate can be meaningfully ascertained at all remains open. 2 3 3

225.
Id.
226.
Id. at 574-75.
227.
See Morgan v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 729 F.2d 1163, 1167 (8th Cir.
1984). The "significant aspects" test was implemented by the Eighth Circuit regarding workplace
claims of a nonsexual nature. Id. For further analysis of this case, see Koplowitz, supra note 98,
at 574-76.
228.
Koplowitz, supra note 98, at 574-76.
229.
Id. at 582.
230.
Id. at 573.
231.
Id.
232.
See supra Section III.A.2.
233.
See generally Barnhizer, supra note 185.
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Most employment contracts contain extremely broad terms that
mandate arbitration of any controversy, claim, or dispute relating to the
employment. 234 Although this ultimately boils down to an exercise of
contract interpretation, courts universally seem to struggle with
determining the parties' intent when faced with such broad, sweeping
language. 235 Generally, when parties use a broad arbitration clause,
courts will "find that the parties meant for the clause to cover all claims
touching upon the contract." 236
Once a court has determined that the dispute is within the scope
of a valid arbitration agreement, it then looks to "whether any 'federal
statute or policy renders the claims nonarbitrable."' 237 According to the
Supreme Court, "[a]lthough all statutory claims may not be appropriate
for arbitration, 'having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should
be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude
a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue."' 2 38 The
Court has further stated that until Congress clearly evidences such an
intent, nothing "prevents a party from excluding statutory claims from
the scope of an agreement to arbitrate."2 39
III. SOLUTION
A. The Ending ForcedArbitration of Sexual HarassmentAct Should
Be Modified to ProhibitEmployers from Enforcing Mandatory
Arbitrationof Any Claims of Sexual Violence
As demonstrated by the #MeToo movement, current approaches
designed to address the systemic issue of sexual violence in the
workplace have proven insufficient. 2 4 0 An employee should never be
compelled by his or her employer to arbitrate any claim arising out of
sexual harassment, misconduct, or assault. Rather, due to the sensitive
nature of these claims, a victim should be afforded the right to choose
the legal forum which he or she believes will best represent his or her
interests.
Under the current judicial framework, it is unclear whether a
court will allow a victim of sexual assault or harassment to escape a
234.
See Koplowitz, supra note 98, at 565.
Id. at 573, 582.
235.
236.
Id. at 582.
237.
Id. at 572 (quoting JP Morgan Chase & Co. v. Conegie ex rel. Lee, 492 F.3d 596, 598
(5th Cir. 2007)).
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi
238.
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628.
239.
240.
See Smith, supra note 127.
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binding arbitration clause within an employment contract. 24 1 As stated
by Justice Gorsuch, "[I]t's the job of Congress by legislation, not [the
Supreme] Court by supposition, both to write the laws and to repeal
them."2 4 2 Thus, Congress should amend the proposed Ending Forced
Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act to prohibit all public and private
employers from entering into or enforcing mandatory arbitration
agreements regarding any claims of sexual assault, sexual harassment,
or sexual misconduct. This revision would allow sexual assault victims
to have their day in court while simultaneously ensuring that most nonsexual workplace-related claims are still held in arbitration
proceedings, thus preserving the efficiency of arbitration more
generally. 243 As evidenced by the #MeToo movement, society has begun
to recognize the power imbalance inherent in the employer-employee
relationship-an imbalance further magnified by allegations of sexual
misconduct.
By forcing victims into binding-and likely biasedarbitration proceedings, employers further tilt the scales against the
employees. By modifying and subsequently enacting the Ending Forced
Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act to allow victims to choose after
the dispute has arisen whether to enter into arbitration or instead
resolve the matter in court, lawmakers can begin to correct this
imbalance.
1. Weaknesses of the Bill as Currently Drafted
As currently written, the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual
Harassment Act is simultaneously too broad and too narrow to address
the systemic issue of sexual violence in the workplace. Presently,
although the bill appears to cover claims of sexual harassment, it does
not explicitly address claims of sexual assault at all.2 4 4 Thus, a victim

241.
For further analysis of the current judicial framework, see supra Section I.C.
242.
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624 (2018).
243.
In 2016, the American Arbitration Association responded to a request for information
on employment disputes involving sexual harassment, and found that only 4 percentof
employment-plan cases in 2014 involved sexual harassment. Dias & Dockterman, supra note 137.
Thus, arbitration between employers and employees would remain largely unchanged.
244.
Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017, S. 2203, 115th Congress
(2017). Note that some may argue that as drafted, the bill implicitly includes claims of sexual
assault. The bill utilizes the term "sexual discrimination dispute," which encompasses claims of
sexual harassment, but not necessarily those of sexual assault. Further, the EEOC qualifies
workplace sexual harassment by requiring it to "explicitly or implicitly affect an individual's
employment." Facts About Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-sex.cfm
[https://perma.cc/ZRM7-F7ZM] (last visited
Nov. 1, 2018). It is thus possible for a clever defense attorney to claim that the conduct in question
did not affect the individual's employment. This Note seeks to circumvent any present ambiguity
to ensure that both sexual harassment and sexual assault are explicitly covered by the bill.
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of both workplace sexual assault and harassment 245 may be faced with
a logistical nightmare--one could be required to pursue a sexual
harassment claim in court while simultaneously submitting the sexual
assault claim to arbitration. 246 This issue is further compounded by the
fact that the test used by courts to determine the arbitrability of sexual
assault claims (i.e., whether sexual assault and harassment claims
"relate to" or "arise out of" the employment relationship) varies among
circuits. 2 47

Victims within a circuit utilizing the "but for" test would

likely be forced to arbitrate a claim involving sexual harassment or
sexual assault, whereas victims within a circuit utilizing the
"significant aspects" test may be able to escape their arbitration
agreements. 248 By amending the proposed language of the Act,
Congress can remedy this uncertainty by rendering all pre-dispute
arbitration agreements regarding sexual violence in the workplace
unenforceable.
However, even if Congress amended the Act to include claims
arising out of sexual violence more broadly, the sheer breadth of the
Act's language may be fatal to its successful implementation. Courts
may interpret the current language so broadly as to preclude
enforcement of the entire arbitration agreement at issue, rather than
only the arbitration of sexual harassment claims. 249 This may lead to
the unintended consequence of drastically altering employment
litigation by rendering many predispute arbitration agreements null
and void.250 Congress can address this issue through a more careful
drafting of the statutory language, as discussed below.
2. Modifying the Proposed Bill
a. Replace "Sex DiscriminationDispute" with "Sexual Violence
Dispute"
The bill, as proposed, prohibits enforcement of an arbitration
agreement between an employer and employee with respect to any "sex
discrimination dispute," which includes claims "arising out of conduct

245.
Experiencing both types of sexual violence in the workplace is not uncommon. See
Harned et al., supra note 8, at 175-80. In a study of 22,372 military women, 941 reported "an
experience of sexual assault by workplace personnel." Id. at 180. Of these 941 women, 938 (99.7
percent) also experienced at least one other type of sexual harassment within the previous 12
months. Id. at 180.
246.
Cf. Liburt, Giese & Perez, supra note 120.
Koplowitz, supra note 98, at 573-76.
247.
248.
Id. at 574.
249.
See Dudek, supranote 19.
250.
Campbell, supra note 126.
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that would form the basis of a claim based on sex" under Title VII. 2 5 1
This Note proposes that legislators replace the statutory term "sex
discrimination dispute" with "sexual violence dispute," which would be
defined as:
[A] dispute between an employer and employee related to or arising out of (1) conduct
that would form the basis of a claim based on sex under title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.) if the employment were employment by an
employer (as defined in section 701(b) of that Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e(b))), regardless of
whether a violation of such title VII is alleged, or (2) sexual assault and battery,
including claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment,
252
or negligent hiring, supervision or retention.

Amending the Act would provide a more appropriate solution to
the systemic issue of sexual violence in the workplace by allowing
victims of sexual misconduct or assault to file suit, if they so desire. By
modifying the language of the Act to also include claims arising out of
sexual assault, the Act would address the dual-forum issue facing
victims of both workplace sexual assault and harassment. 253
Additionally, Congress would alleviate the discrepancy among circuits
regarding the arbitrability of claims of sexual violence in the
workplace. 254 Rather than leaving the issue of arbitrability of sexual
violence claims up to individual judges, all predispute arbitration
agreements regarding sexual violence would be completely
unenforceable. This would ultimately ease the burden on victims, as
they would face one less hurdle in their attempts to seek justice.
b. Add a Specific ProvisionDelineatingthe Breadth of the Act
In addition to modifying the types of claims covered by the Act,
the Act should be amended to include a specific provision that defines
the scope of unenforceability to avoid the potential unintended
consequence of invalidating the entire arbitration agreement. The Act
should add a provision to the effect of: "Notwithstanding the foregoing,
all disputes other than 'sexual violence disputes' are subject to the
terms of the predispute arbitration agreement."
This short clause would (1) assuage the fears that entire
arbitration agreements would be invalidated by the passage of the Act
and (2) ensure that other types of claims can still be heard in the most
efficient and cost-effective forum. This may make passage of the bill
251.
Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017, S. 2203, 115th Congress
(2017).
252.
This language is derived from the current bill, S. 2203, as well as the Franken
Amendment. See H.R. 3326 111th Cong. § 8116 (2010).
253.
See supra Section III.A. 1.
254.
See generally Koplowitz, supra note 98.
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more likely, as it would more effectively represent the interests of probusiness and pro-arbitration representatives.
c. Add a Specific ProvisionRegarding NondisclosureAgreements
The recent Hollywood sexual harassment and assault scandals
have led to public scrutiny regarding the use of nondisclosure
agreements within employment contracts. 255 Although this Note
argues that nondisclosure agreements are generally inappropriate
when involving claims of sexual misconduct, a blanket elimination of
nondisclosure agreements within employment contracts would be
inapposite. Nondisclosure agreements serve the important purpose of
protecting sensitive information, such as confidential financial
A complete elimination of
information or trade secrets. 256
confidentiality provisions in the employment context would, at best,
lead to waste by forcing companies to execute project-specific
confidentiality agreements. At worst, this would expose employers to
severe risk regarding the safety of confidential-and valuablecompany information. Additionally, contrary to popular belief, all
nondisclosure agreements "allow victims to report harassment,
discrimination and criminal activity to authorities." 257 Thus, regardless
of what an employee has signed, he or she always maintains the right
to contact the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or file a
258
police report.

Instead of a blanket prohibition against nondisclosure
agreements in employment contracts, Congress could add a provision to
the Act that requires all nondisclosure agreements within employment
contracts to contain an exception for claims involving sexual misconduct
or assault. Congress could use language similar to the following: "Any
restriction as to the disclosure of Confidential Information shall not
apply to any claims related to or arising out of sexual assault,
misconduct, or harassment."
This would enable employers to continue to use confidentiality
agreements within employment contracts, but would also allow victims
to publicly air their grievances if they so choose.

255.
256.
257.

See Buckley, supra note 151.
Koren, supra note 204.
See id.

258.

Id.; see also Dias & Dockterman, supra note 137.
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B. Why a Victim's Right to Choose the Legal Forum Is of Vital
Importance
There is an inherent tension in sexual harassment or assault
cases between the best interests of the victim and the best interests of
society at large. On the one hand, a "rational" victim interested in selfpreservation would likely choose to settle a case-or potentially even
avoid reporting misconduct altogether-in order to avoid the associated
personal and professional costs. 2 5 9 On the other hand, releasing
information into the public sphere about potential aggressors benefits
society at large.
Giving victims the right to choose the legal, forum would
ultimately help address the inherent conflict between self-preservation
and helping society at large. If victim employees are empowered to
choose the forum, they may be more willing to report misconduct-as
they would be able to opt out of a potentially biased arbitration
proceeding. Should the victim particularly value the anonymity or
timeliness of arbitration, he or she could choose to submit the dispute
to an arbitrator.
By their very nature, claims arising out of sexual harassment or
assault are often traumatic. Survivors' responses to sexual trauma "are
complex and unique to each individual," and while "[s]ome survivors
experience severe and chronic psychological symptoms, . . . others

experience little or no distress." 260 There is no such thing as a "typical"
survivor, 2 6 1 and thus there is no correct, one-size-fits-all forum for

resolution of these claims.
The victim of sexual harassment or sexual assault should be
empowered to choose which forum-if any-he or she feels is within his
or her best interests. In every other context, the legal system gives
plaintiffs the option to settle while concealing information; why should
claims arising out of sexual misconduct within the employment sphere
be any different? If anything, the sensitive and traumatic nature of
these experiences suggests that the legal system is obligated to afford
victims the right to be heard on their own terms.

259.

CARLSON, supra note 168, at 8.

260.

NICOLE P. YUAN, MARY P. Koss & MIRTO STONE, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES

OF SEXUAL TRAUMA 1, 11 (2006), https://vawnet.org/sites/default/files/materials/files/201609/ARPsychConsequences.pdf [https://perma.cc/3F86-DK2D]. Immediate effects, including shock,
fear, anxiety, confusion, and social withdrawal, as well as PTSD symptoms, such as emotional
detachment, flashbacks, and sleeping problems, are common psychological consequences of sexual
trauma. Id. at 5. Rape survivors, in particular, report rates of PTSD symptoms between 30 and 65
percent, depending on the method and timing of assessment. Id.
261.
Id. at 1 ("The wide range of consequences may be attributed to assault characteristics,
environmental conditions, survivor attributes, and availability of social support and resources.").
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IV. CONCLUSION

The easiest mistake any employer can make is to assume that
"this could never happen here." While it is natural to hope and believe
that is the case, one of the fundamental lessons of recent months is that
people's voices need to be heard if their problems are to be addressed. 262
The #MeToo movement empowered victims of workplace sexual
harassment and assault to speak out and share their stories.
Eventually, the social media frenzy will die down, as it always does. 2 6 3
The hashtag #MeToo will be buried beneath the newest political
scandal or clever celebrity tweet, and will no longer receive the
consistent recognition that it deserves. Thus, it is important that
Congress enacts carefully drafted legislation now, while public outcry
is strong enough to propel the movement forward.
Although celebrity activism brought the pervasive reality of
sexual misconduct in the workplace to the national stage, the issue
"belong[s] to virtually every profession and walk of life." 2 6 4 In her victim
impact statement, McKayla Maroney emphasized that "[p]eople should
know that sexual abuse .. . is not just happening in Hollywood, in the
media or in the halls of Congress. This is happening everywhere.
Wherever there is a position of power, there seems to be potential for
abuse."265
For the average employee, the personal and professional cost of
can be
assault
or sexual
harassment
sexual
workplace
This is further compounded by mandatory
insurmountable. 266
arbitration provisions within employment contracts, which "prevent
exactly the type of media coverage which has made the #[Me[T]oo
movement so effective."2 6 7
Sexual harassment and assault are nonpartisan issues that
demand an immediate legislative response. As Gretchen Carlson aptly
stated, "[W]hen somebody decides to sexually harass you, they don't ask

262.

Smith, supra note 127.

263.

For example, before the Harvey Weinstein scandal broke and reinvigorated the

#MeToo movement, society was outraged by the tech industry's "bro-culture" problem. See Laura
Colby, Why So Few Women Break Through Tech's Bro Culture, BLOOMBERG (June 2, 2017, 10:28
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-02/why-so-few-women-break-throughBefore "bro-culture" made
[https://perma.cc/D8VU-5H9Z].
tech-s-bro-culture-quicktake-q-a
national headlines, the nation was captivated and appalled by Gretchen Carlson's story of
workplace harassment. See Koblin, supra note 135; Wemple, supra note 138.

264.
265.

CARLSON, supra note 1, at 4.
Abrams, supra note 205.

266.

See CARLSON, supra note 1, at 8.
Alli Mandoske, Forced Arbitration Silences Victims of Sexual Harassment, FITE L.

267.

(Feb. 12, 2018), http://fitelawgroup.com/forced-arbitration-silences-victims-sexual-harassment/
[https://perma.cc/C6AW-JLDJ].
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you if you are a Republican or a Democrat or an independent [sic] ....
They just do it."268 Unfortunately, currently proposed legislation aimed
at combating institutionalized sexual harassment fails to address other
forms of sexual violence, including sexual assault, and may have the
unintended and far-reaching consequence of completely invalidating
many employer-employee predispute arbitration agreements. 269 By
modifying the proposed Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual
Harassment Act to include all claims of sexual violence, Congress can
empower victims to choose the legal forum in which to share their
stories. The victim's right to choose how and where-if at all-to share
his or her experiences is f utmost importance. Forcing every employee
to endure the public judgment accompanying trial is an inappropriate
legislative response, as it takes their control away in a similar manner
as subjecting them to mandatory arbitration. Arbitration and trial each
present their own costs and benefits, and the determination of which
forum is most appropriate should ultimately be left to the employee.
The clock is ticking for Congress, which has the power to transform
what could be just another fleeting Hollywood moment into permanent
legislation that protects victims of sexual violence nationwide. "No
more silence. No more waiting. No more tolerance for discrimination,
harassment or abuse. Time's up."2 7 0
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270.

Guynn, supra note 115.
See Dudek, supra note 19.
See TIME'S UP, supra note 153.
*
J.D. Candidate, 2019, Vanderbilt University Law School; B.S., 2014, California
Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo. The Author would like to thank her father, Mike
Sullivan, for his constant support and encouragement. Many thanks to the staff of the Vanderbilt
Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law-especially Natalie Pike, Erin Meyers, and Reem
Blaik-for their hard work and insightful guidance.

The Vanderbilt Journalof Entertainment & Technology Law is published four times per
year by the Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law, Vanderbilt Law School,
Nashville, TN 37203-1181. "Second Class" postage is paid at Nashville, Tennessee, and at an
additional mailing office. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Vanderbilt Journal of
Entertainment & Technology Law, Vanderbilt Law School, 131 21st Avenue South, Nashville, TN
37203-1181.
Website and Blog: http://www.jetlaw.org
Subscriptions: Subscriptions are $35.00 per volume (domestic) and $40.00 per volume
(foreign). Subscriptions commence with the Fall issue of each volume. All subscriptions are
continued for each succeeding volume unless subscribers provide timely notice of cancellation.
Address changes must be made at least six weeks before publication date.

&

Inquiries and Information: Direct all address changes and requests for subscription
information and back issues to Administrative Editor, Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment
Technology Law, Vanderbilt Law School, 131 21st Avenue South, Nashville, TN 37203-1181. The
price for back issues is $20.00 per issue, not including shipping and handling. Back issues are also
available in PDF format at http://www.jetlaw.org.
Manuscripts: The Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law accepts
submission through ExpressO, Scholastica, emails sent to jetl@vanderbilt.edu (attach as a Word
document), and postal mail. All submissions or inquiries regarding the submission of an article
should be sent to the attention of the Senior Articles Editor. Electronic submission is preferred;
however, if you must send by postal mail, please direct all mail to Senior Articles Editor,
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law, Vanderbilt Law School, 131 21st Avenue
South, Nashville, TN 37203-1181.
Antidiscrimination Policy: It is the policy of the Vanderbilt Journalof Entertainment
& Technology Law not to discriminate on the basis of race, gender, age, religion, ethnic
background, marital status, or sexual orientation.
The Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law supports robust and open
academic discussions of all topics in the areas of intellectual property and technology. However,
the viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily represent the views of Vanderbilt
University Law School or its faculty, authors, and staff.
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law
(ISSN 1536-3872)
©2018 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law, Vanderbilt Law School

VANDERBILT LAW SCHOOL
OFFICERS OF THE UNIVERSITY
Nicholas Zeppos, Chancellor of the University; Professorof Law
Susan Wente, Provost and Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs
Audrey Anderson, Vice Chancellor, General Counsel and Secretary of the University
Jeffrey Balser, Vice Chancellor for Health Affairs and Dean of the School of Medicine
Steve Ertel, Vice Chancellorfor Communications
Nathan Green, Vice Chancellorfor PublicAffairs
Anders Hall, Vice Chancellorfor Investments and Chief Investment Officer
Eric Kopstain, Vice Chancellor for Administration
John M. Lutz, Vice Chancellorfor Information Technology
Tina L. Smith, Interim Vice Chancellor for Equity, Diversity and Inclusion and Interim
Chief Diversity Officer
Susie Stalcup, Vice Chancellorfor Development and Alumni Relations
Brett Sweet, Vice Chancellorfor Finance and Chief FinancialOfficer
David Williams II, Vice Chancellorfor University Affairs and Athletics; Athletics
Director;Professor of Law

LAW SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS
Chris Guthrie, Dean; John Wade-Kent Syverud Professorof Law
Susan Kay, Associate Dean for ClinicalAffairs; Clinical Professorof Law
Spring Miller, Assistant Dean for Public Interest; Lecturer in Law
Larry Reeves, Associate Dean; Director, Alyne Queener Massey Law Library;Associate
Professor of Law
Christopher Serkin, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs; Professor of Law

FACULTY
Brooke Ackerly, Associate Professorof PoliticalScience; Associate Professorof Philosophy;
Associate Professor of Law; Affiliated Faculty, Women's and Gender Studies;Principal
Investigator, Global Feminisms Collaborative
Phillip Ackerman-Lieberman, Associate Professor of Jewish Studies; Associate Professor of
Religious Studies; Affiliated Associate Professorof Islamic and History; Associate Professor
of Law
Rebecca Allensworth, Professor of Law
Robert Barsky, Professor of French, English and Jewish Studies; Professorof Law
Lauren Benton, Dean, Vanderbilt University College of Arts and Science; Nelson 0. Tyrone, Jr.
Chair in History; Professor of Law
Margaret Blair, Milton R. Underwood Chairin Free Enterprise;Professor of Law
Frank Bloch, Professor of Law Emeritus
James Blumstein, University Professor of ConstitutionalLaw and Health Law & Policy;
Professor of Management, Owen Graduate School of Management; Director, Vanderbilt
Health Policy Center
C. Dent Bostick, Professor of Law Emeritus; Dean Emeritus
Lisa Bressman, David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair in Law; Professorof Law
Michael Bressman, Professor of the Practiceof Law
Gary Brown, Professor of the Practiceof Law; Partner,Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough
Jon Bruce, Professor of Law Emeritus
Ari Bryen, Assistant Professor of Classicaland Mediterranean Studies;Assistant Professorof
History; Assistant Professorof Law
Christopher (Kitt) Carpenter, Professorof Economics; Professorof Law; Professorof Health
Policy; Professorof LeadershipPolicy and Organizations
Edward Cheng, Hess Chairin Law; Professor of Law

William Christie, FrancesHampton Currey Professor of Management in Finance; Professor of
Law
Jessica Clarke, Professorof Law
Ellen Clayton, Craig-Weaver Chair in Pediatrics;Professor of Pediatrics;Professor of Health
Policy; Professorof Law
Mark Cohen, Justin Potter Professorof American Competitive Enterprise; Professorof
Management; Professor of Law; University Fellow, Resources for the Future
Robert Covington, Professorof Law Emeritus
Andrew Daughety, Gertrude Conaway Vanderbilt Professor of Economics; Professorof
Economics; Professor of Law
Colin Dayan, Robert Penn Warren Professorin the Humanities; Professorof American Studies;
Professor of Law
Paul Edelman, Professorof Mathematics;Professorof Law
Joseph Fishman, Associate Professorof Law
James Ely, Jr., Milton R. Underwood Professorof Law Emeritus; Professor of History Emeritus;
Lecturer in Law
Brian Fitzpatrick, Professor of Law
Tracey George, Associate Provost for Faculty Affairs; Charles B. Cox III and Lucy D. Cox Family
Chair in Law & Liberty; Professor of PoliticalScience; Director, Cecil D. Branstetter
Litigation and Dispute Resolution Program
Daniel Gervais, Milton R. Underwood Chair in Law; Professor of Law; Professorof French;
Director, Vanderbilt Intellectual Property Program;Director, LL.M. Program
Leor Halevi, Associate Professor of History;Associate Professorof Law
G.S. Hans, Assistant Clinical Professor of Law
Joni Hersch, Cornelius Vanderbilt Chair;Professorof Law and Economics; Co-Director, Ph.D.
Program in Law and Economics
Alex Hurder, ClinicalProfessor of Law Emeritus
Sarah Igo, Associate History; Associate Professor of Law
Owen Jones, New York Alumni Chancellor's Chair in Law; Professor of Law; Professor of
Biological Sciences; Director, MacArthur FoundationResearch Network on Law and
Neuroscience
Allaire Karzon, Professorof Law Emerita
Nancy King, Lee S. and CharlesA. Speir Chair in Law; Professorof Law
Craig Lewis, Madison S. Wigginton Professor of Finance;Professorof Law
David Lewis, Chair, PoliticalScience; William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor of Political Science;
Professor of Law
Harold Maier 1937-2014, David Daniels Professorof Law Emeritus
Terry Maroney, Professorof Law; Professorof Medicine, Health, and Society; ChancellorFaculty
Fellow; Co-Director, George Barrett Social Justice Program
John Marshall, Associate Professorof Law Emeritus
Larry May, W. Alton Chairof Philosophy; Professor of Law
Sara Mayeux, Assistant Professor;Assistant Professorof Law
Holly McCammon, Professorof Human and OrganizationDevelopment; Professorof Law;
Professorof Sociology
Thomas McCoy, Professorof Law Emeritus
Thomas McGinn, Professor of History; Professorof Law
Karla McKanders; Clinical Professorof Law
Timothy Meyer, Professorof Law
Robert Mikos, Professor of Law
Beverly Moran, Professorof Law; Professor of Sociology
Michael Newton, Professorof the Practiceof Law; Professor of the Practiceof Political Science;
Director, Vanderbilt-in-Venice Program
Robert Reder, Professorof the Practiceof Law; Partner, Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy
(Retired)
Jennifer Reinganum, E. Bronson Ingram Professorof Economics; Professorof Law
Morgan Ricks, Professorof Law
Lauren Rogal, Assistant Clinical Professor
Amanda Rose, Professor of Law; Professor of Management, Owen GraduateSchool of Business
Barbara Rose, Instructorin Law
James Rossi, Associate Dean for Research; Professor of Law; Judge D. L. Lansden Chair in Law
Edward Rubin, University Professorof Law and PoliticalScience

John B. Ruhl, David Daniels Allen DistinguishedChairin Law; Professorof Law; Director,
Program in Law and Innovation; Co-Director,Energy, Environment, and Land Use
Program
Herwig Schlunk, Professor of Law
Jeffrey Schoenblum, CentennialProfessor of Law
Sean Seymore, Professor of Law; Professor of Chemistry
Daniel Sharfstein, Tarkington Chairof Teaching Excellence; Professorof Law; Professorof
History; Chancellor Faculty Fellow; Co-Director, George Barrett Social Justice Program
Matthew Shaw, Assistant Professor of Education;Assistant Professorof Law
Suzanna Sherry, Herman 0. Loewenstein Chair in Law
Jennifer Shinall, Associate Professor of Law
Ganesh Sitaraman, Chancellor Faculty Fellow; Professor of Law; Director, Program in Law and
Government
Paige Skiba, Professor of Law
Christopher Slobogin, Milton R. Underwood Chair in Law; Professor of Law; Director, Criminal
Justice Program;Affiliate Professor of Psychiatry
Kevin Stack, Lee S. and Charles A Speir Chairin Law; Professorof Law; Director of
Graduate Studies, Ph.D. Program in Law and Economics
Jennifer Swezey, Assistant Professorof Law; Director, Legal Research and Writing Program
Randall Thomas, John S. Beasley II Chair in Law and Business; Director, Law and Business
Program;Professor of Management, Owen Graduate School of Management
R. Lawrence Van Horn, Associate Professor of Management (Economics);Associate Professor of
Law; Executive Director of Health Affairs
Michael Vandenbergh, David DanielsAllen DistinguishedChair in Law; Professorof Law;
Director, Climate Change Research Network; Co-Director,Energy, Environment, and Land
Use Program
W. Kip Viscusi, University DistinguishedProfessorof Law, Economics, and Management;
Professor of Management; Professor of Economics; Co-Director, Ph.D. Programin Law and
Economics
Kimberly Welch, Assistant Professor of History; Assistant Professorof Law
Alan Wiseman, Professor of PoliticalScience; Professor of Law
Ingrid Wuerth, Helen Strong Curry Chair in InternationalLaw; Professorof Law; Director,
InternationalLegal Studies Program
Yesha Yadav, Professor of Law; EnterpriseScholar for 2017-19; Faculty Co-Director, LL.M.
Program

Claire Abely, Instructorin Law
Lawrence Ahern III, Adjunct Professorof Law; Partner,Brown & Ahern
Arshad Ahmed, Adjunct Professor of Law; Co-Founder, Elixir Capital Management
Richard Aldrich Jr., Adjunct Professorof Law; Partner,Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom
(Retired)
Roger Alsup, Instructorin Law
Paul Ambrosius, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Trauger & Tuke
Rachel Andersen-Watts, Instructorin Law
Christopher Bellamy, Adjunct Professor of Law; Associate, Neal & Harwell
Linda Breggin, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior Attorney, EnvironmentalLaw Institute
Larry Bridgesmith, Adjunct Professor of Law; CoordinatorProgram on Law & Innovation;
InauguralExecutive Director, Institutefor Conflict Management, Lipscomb University
Kenneth Byrd, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, CabraserHeimann & Bernstein
Judge Sheila Calloway, Adjunct Professor of Law; Juvenile Court Magistrate, Metropolitan
Nashville
Meredith Capps, Foreign and InternationalLaw Librarian;Lecturer in Law
Mark Chalos, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Lieff CabraserHeimann & Bernstein
William Chandler, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner,Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati
Jenny Cheng, Lecturer in Law
William Cohen, Adjunct Professor of Law
Christopher Coleman, Adjunct Professorof Law
Roger Conner, Adjunct Professor of Law; Special Consultant on Public Service Career
Development
Matthew Curley, Adjunct Professorof Law; Member, Bass Berry & Sims

S. Carran Daughtrey, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant U.S. Attorney, Middle Tennessee
District
Paul, Deemer, Adjunct Professorof Law; Of Counsel, Vinson & Elkins, London (Retired Partner)
Diane Di lanni, Adjunct Professorof Law
Sarah Dunaway, Research Services Librarian;Lecturer in Law
Jason Epstein, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Nelson Mullins
Anne-Marie Farmer, Adjunct Professorof Law
Susan Foxman, Adjunct Professor of Law
Glenn Funk, Adjunct Professor of Law; DistrictAttorney General, 20h Judicial District of
Tennessee
Jason Gichner, Adjunct Professorof Law; Attorney, Morgan & Morgan
Vice Chancellor Sam Glassock, Adjunct Professor of Law; Vice Chancellor, Delaware Court of
Chancery
Katie Hanschke, Head of Access Services, Law Library; Lecturer in Law
Aubrey (Trey) Harwell III, Adjunct Professor of Law
Kristen Hildebrand, Instructorin Law
Darwin Hindman III, Adjunct Professorof Law; Shareholder,Baker Donelson
The Honorable Randy Holland, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior of Counsel, Wilson Sonshi
Goodrich & Rosati
Abrar Hussain, Adjunct Professorof Law; Co-founder and ManagingDirector, Elixir Capital
Management
Lynne Ingram, Adjunct Professorof Law; Assistant U.S. Attorney, Middle District of Tennessee
Martesha Johnson, Adjunct Professorof Law; Assistant Public Defender, MetropolitanNashville
Public Defender's Office, 20h Judicial District
The Honorable Kent Jordan, Adjunct Professorof Law; Assistant PublicDefender, Metropolitan
Nashville Public Defender's Office, 20h Judicial District
Andrew Kaufman, Adjunct Professor of Law
Suzanne Kessler, Adjunct Professorof Law; Of Counsel, Bone McAllester Norton
Kevin Klein, Adjunct Professorof Law; Member, Klein Bussell
Russell Korobkin, Visiting Professor of Law; Richard C. Maxwell Professor of Law, UCLA Law
School
Kelly Leventis, Instructorin Law
William Martin, Adjunct Professorof Law, General Counsel, FirstBank;Retired Board Chair,
Stewardship Council
Cheryl Mason, Adjunct Professor of Law; Vice President, LitigationHCA
Richard McGee, Adjunct Professorof Law
James McNamara, Adjunct Professorof Law; Assistant Public Defender, Metro Nashville Public
Defender's Office
Robert McNeal, Adjunct Professorof Law; Shareholder,Liskow & Lewis
Caitlin Moon, Directorof Innovation Design, Program in Law and Innovation;Adjunct Professor
of Law
Kelly Murray, Instructor in Law
Francisco Milssnich, Adjunct Professorof Law; Senior Partner,Barbosa Mussnich & Aragao
Advogados
Sara Beth Myers, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant Attorney General, State of Tennessee
William Norton, Adjunct Professorof Law; Partner,Bradley Arant Boult Cummings
R. Gregory Parker, Adjunct Professorof Law; Member, Bass Berry & Sims
C. Mark Pickrell, Adjunct Professorof Law; Owner Pickrell Law Group
Steven Riley, Adjunct Professorof Law; Partner, Riley Warnock & Jacobson
Brian Roark, Adjunct Professorof Law; Partner, Bass Berry & Sims
Barbara Rose, Instructor in Law
Edmund Sauer, Adjunct Professorof Law; Partner,Bradley Arant Boult Cummings
Deborah Schander, Associate Directorof Alyne Queener Massey Law Library;Lecturer in Law
Mark Schein, Adjunct Professorof Law; Chief Compliance Officer, York CapitalManagement
Matthew Schneller, Instructor in Law
Paul Schnell, Adjunct Professorof Law; Partner, Shadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom
Teresa Sebastian, Adjunct Professor of Law
Arjun Sethi, Adjunct Professorof Law
Dumaka Shabazz, Adjunct Professorof Law; Assistant Federal PublicDefender, FederalPublic
Defender's Office
Justin Shuler, Adjunct Professorof Law; Legal Counsel, VEREIT, Inc.
Joseph Slights, Vice Chancellor, Delaware Court of Chancery;Adjunct Professorof Law

Saul Solomon, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Klein & Bussell
John Spagens, Adjunct Professor of Law; Associate, Lieff CabraserHeimann & Bernstein
Willy Stern, Adjunct Professor of Law
Tatiana Stoljarova, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior Legal Counsel, Bridgestone Americas Inc.
Cara Suvall, Assistant Clinical Professorof Law
Wendy Tucker, Adjunct Professor of Law; Attorney, McGee Lyons and Ballinger; Member,
Tennessee Board of Education
Timothy Warnock, Adjunct Professorof Law; Partner,Riley Warnock & Jacobson
Robert Watson, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior Vice President& Chief Legal Officer,
Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority
Susan Watson, Adjunct Visiting Professor of Law; Professorof Law and Deputy Dean, University
of Auckland Law School
Mark Williams, Head of DigitalInitiatives, Law Library;Lecturer in Law
Thomas Wiseman II, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Wiseman Ashworth Law Group
Luther Wright, Adjunct Professor of Law; Of Counsel, Ogletree Deakins
Tyler Yarbro, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Dodson Behm & Capparella
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